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NOTE
Witness for the Defense: A Right to
Immunity
I. INTRODUCTION
The government's power to compel testimony has ancient ori-
gins. As early as 1562 the courts of England were authorized by
statute1 to compel testimony from unwilling witnesses. In 1612 the
King's Bench quoted a speech by Sir Francis Bacon in which he
remarked that "all subjects, without distinction of degrees, owe to
the king tribute and service, not only by their deed and hand, but
of their knowledge and discovery."'12 While it is unclear when grand
juries began to use compulsory process to ensure the attendance
and testimony of witnesses, the principle that "the public has a
claim to every man's evidence"'3 was firmly established by 1742.
The Framers of the United States Constitution recognized the gov-
ernment's power to compel testimony and the citizen's duty to tes-
tify in the requirements of the sixth amendment.4 The first Con-
gress also acknowledged the testimonial duty when it provided for
compulsory attendance of witnesses in federal courts in the Judici-
ary Act of 1789. 5 More recently Justice White noted that "[a]mong
the necessary and most important of the powers of the States as
well as the Federal Government to assure the effective functioning
1. An Act for Punishment of such as shall procure or commit any wilful Perjury, 1562,
5 Eliz. 1, c. 9, § 12. The statute authorized a penalty and civil action against anyone who
refused to testify after service of process and payment of expenses.
2. Speech of Sir Francis Bacon, quoted in Countess of Shrewsbury's Case, 2 How.
State Tr. 770, 778 (K.B. 1612).
3. This old English maxim was cited in 1742 on the floor of the House of Lords by
Lord Chancellor Hardwicke during a debate on the Bill to Indemnify Evidence, an early
immunity law. 8 J. WIGMoaz, EVDzNCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The United States
Supreme Court has frequently cited the maxim with the substitution of "right" for "claim."
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 345 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
... be confronted with the witnesses against him... [and] have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor. .. "
5. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 73.
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of government in an ordered society is the broad power to compel
residents to testify in court or before grand juries or agencies."' He
concluded that "[s]uch testimony constitutes one of the Govern-
ment's primary sources of information."'7
The government's power to compel testimony, however, is not
unlimited. The most notable exception to the testimonial duty is
the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimina-
tion,8 which also has its roots in early English legal history.9 One
commentator has characterized the privilege as "one of the great
landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized." 10 Evidence
of the importance of the fifth amendment privilege is indicated by
its historical development and expansion into a broader protection
than that initially perceived by a literal reading of the fifth amend-
ment. Although the fifth amendment privilege is unavailable to
non-natural persons such as labor unions11 and corporations,12
there are few restrictions on the privilege. It is a "personal" privi-
lege13 because it must be claimed by the witness only for his own
protection. The scope of the privilege extends beyond defendants
in criminal proceedings to protect any witness in any proceed-
ing-civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or
adjudicatory14-from all disclosures that the witness reasonably
6. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 93-94 (1964) (White, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 94.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides, "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.. .. "
9. The whipping of a defendant in a proceeding before the Star Chamber for failing to
respond to the oath ex officio nero, which imposed on a witness the duty to testify, Lilburn
Trial, 3 How. State Tr. 1315 (1637), created a public outcry that caused Parliament to aban-
don both the oath and the Star Chamber.
10. E. GRIswoLD, THE Fn'n AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955). Justice Goldberg noted that
the fifth amendment
reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness
to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or
contempt;... our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by
requiring the government... in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire
load,". . . ; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right
of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life," . . . ; our
distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while
sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent."
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citations omitted).
11. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
12. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
13. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (privilege cannot be claimed
to protect another).
14. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which
the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceed-
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believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to
other evidence that might be so used.15 The fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination applied only to federal government
proceedings until the 1964 landmark decision of Malloy v. Ho-
gan,16 in which the Supreme Court applied the privilege to the
states by means of the fourteenth amendment.
Because of its broad scope, the fifth amendment privilege is
often an effective barrier to the government's efforts to obtain in-
formation. Concomitant with the expansion of the privilege, two
methods developed to alleviate the government's problem of ob-
taining privileged information: Executive pardons and immunity
statutes. Justice Brown observed in Brown v. Walker1" that both
executive pardons and immunity statutes are "based upon the idea
that, if the testimony sought cannot possibly be used as a basis for,
or in aid of, a criminal prosecution against the witness, the rule
[against self-incrimination] ceases to apply."1 8
The executive pardon, used as an instrument of clemency in
England by the eighteenth century, was considered a method of
law enforcement at the time of the 1787 American Constitutional
Convention.19 During the 1807 treason trial of Aaron Burr,20 Presi-
dent Jefferson attempted to give an executive pardon to Dr. Boll-
man, one of the witnesses against Burr.2 1 Dr. Bollman, however,
refused to accept the pardon, originally planning to rely instead on
his fifth amendment privilege.2 2 His refusal raised the question
whether a pardon must be accepted in order to be operative. The
question became moot in the Burr trial because Boilman subse-
quently testified without either accepting the pardon or claiming
the privilege.23 The question, however, that arose out of the Burr
ings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who
gives it. The privilege protects a mere witness as fully as it does one who is also a party
defendant.
Id. at 40.
15. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). "To sustain the privilege, it need
only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked,
that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered
might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." Id. at 486-87.
16. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
17. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
18. Id. at 597.
19. E. CoRwIN, Tm PRsi ENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 159 (4th rev. ed.
1957).
20. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693).
21. Id. at 63.
22. Id. at 63-64.
23. Id.
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trial-whether a witness may refuse an executive pardon-has
never been satisfactorily resolved by the Supreme Court.24 The re-
sulting uncertainty partially explains the infrequent use of the ex-
ecutive pardon because if a witness can refuse an executive pardon,
then he may freely assert his fifth amendment privilege and fore-
close the government from obtaining the desired information. The
"acceptance doctrine," pronounced by Chief Justice Marshall in
1833, is the only Supreme Court statement that provides any an-
swer to the question whether an executive pardon may be refused.
A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which, delivery is essential, and delivery
is not complete, without acceptance. It may then be rejected by the person to
whom it is tendered; and if it be rejected, we have discovered no power in a
court to force it on him2
Despite case law that has modified the acceptance doctrine,'2 it is
generally acknowledged that an executive pardon may be refused.
Unless the Supreme Court reexamines the acceptance doctrine and
adopts a rule that requires a witness to accept an executive par-
don, the pardoning power will probably remain unused as a means
of compelling testimony in federal proceedings.
Immunity statutes, 7 on the other hand, have been widely used
as a method of information acquisition to overcome claims of privi-
lege.2 s Since the enactment of the first federal immunity statute in
1857, s prosecutors have had statutory authority to grant immunity
to witnesses resorting to a fifth amendment claim of privilege. Jus-
tice Frankfurter observed that since 1857 Congress has approved
immunity statutes with such consistency that these statutes have
"become part of our constitutional fabric."' 0 Immunity statutes
have undergone a variety of changes that involved the courts and
commentators in a vigorous and ongoing debate focusing not on
their validity, but on their constitutionally required scope.3 1 The
24. See E. CORWIN, supra note 19, at 413 n.123.
25. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 161 (1833).
26. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927); Chapman v. Scott, 10 F.2d 156 (D. Conn.
1925).
27. The informal immunity offered by law enforcement agents and the unwritten and
noncourt approved agreement of the prosecutor not to prosecute are beyond the scope of
this Note. For a recent discussion of judicial supervision of these nonstatutory forms of
immunity, see 65 J. Cmu. L. & CRDMNOLOGY 334 (1974).
28. See text accompanying notes 153-56 infra.
29. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, § 2, 11 Stat. 155; see text accompanying notes 44-55
infra.
30. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956).
31. See, e.g., Note, Witness Immunity Statutes: The Constitutional and Functional
Sufficiency of "Use Immunity", 51 B.U.L. REv. 616 (1971); Note, Immunity Statutes and
1668 [Vol. 34:1665
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scope of the protection afforded a witness depends primarily on
whether the statute grants transactional or use immunity. Transac-
tional immunity completely immunizes a witness from prosecution
for any transaction mentioned in the compelled testimony. Use im-
munity, on the other hand, only prevents the government from
later utilizing the witness' testimony to develop or try a case
against him. The debate over the proper scope of immunity stat-
utes has subsided since the Supreme Court's 1972 ruling that "im-
munity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope
of the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is suffi-
cient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. 32
An issue corresponding in importance to the type of immunity
granted, and which has been largely ignored except by a few com-
mentators"3 and judges34 in recent years, is whether defendants
should also have the right to immunize witnesses. In 1966 the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit held in Earl v. United States" that a
defendant has no constitutional right to immunize a witness. Then
Circuit Judge Warren Burger based his majority opinion on a sepa-
ration of powers analysis and concluded that permitting the de-
fense to immunize witnesses would constitute an invasion of the
prosecutorial discretion of the executive branch.36 Despite a change
in the scope of statutory immunity since the Earl decision,3 7 virtu-
ally all state and federal cases acknowledging the defense witness
immunity issue have firmly adhered not only to Earl's holding but
the Constitution, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 959 (1968); Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity
Acts In Theory and Practice: Teading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568
(1963).
32. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972); see text accompanying notes
145-50 infra.
33. Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. Ray. 71, 166-70 (1974);
Note, A Re-Examination of Defense Witness Immunity: A New Use for Kastigar, 10 HiARv.
J. LEGiS. 74, 79 (1972); 67 COLUM. L. Rav. 953, 977 (1967).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Gaither, 539 F.2d 753, 753-55 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam)
(separate statement of Bazelon, C.J., on denial of motion for rehearing en banc) (issue is
"vital to the fair administration of criminal justice"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976);
United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Leonard, 494
F.2d 955, 985 n.79 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
United States v. Jones, 476 F.2d 885, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting from
denial of motion for release pending appeal).
35. 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing denied, 364 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en bane)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
36. Id. at 534-35.
37. In 1970 a statute changed the type of immunity offered at the federal level from
"transactional" to "use" immunity. See notes 139-40 & 142-43 infra and accompanying text.
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also to its separation of powers analysis.ss Accordingly, the federal
courts, including the Supreme Court, have routinely rejected ap-
peals based on the denial of immunity for defense witnesses.39
Contrary to Earl and its progeny, however, the Third Circuit
recently held in Virgin Islands v. Smith4° that under certain cir-
cumstances due process requires a judicial grant of immunity for a
defense witness. 41 Smith has been soundly rejected by other
courts.'2 Nevertheless, this Note focuses on the proper implemen-
tation of the current federal witness immunity statute43 and con-
cludes that the Smith approach is not only practicable but also
constitutionally required. This Note first traces the evolution of
immunity statutes and examines the multiple analytical ap-
proaches recently invoked by the courts in reaching their divergent
opinions. The Note then evaluates the various constitutional bases
for defense witness immunity and the conflicting interests at stake.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF IMMUNITY LEGISLATION
A. The Immunity Act of 1857
The first American" immunity statute,3 passed by Congress
38. The exceptions are Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); United
States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979); United
States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 412
(E.D. Pa. 1980). For a list of cases that follow Earl even after the change in the immunity
statute, see note 39 infra.
39. See, e.g., In re Daly, 549 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Stofsky, 527
F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); Thompson v. Garrison, 516 F.2d
986 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933 (1975); United States v. Bautista, 509 F.2d 675 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); United States v. Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d
492 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975); United States v. Ramsey,
503 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1975); Cerda v. United States, 488
F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Jenkins, 470 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. de-
nied, 411 U.S. 920 (1973); United States v. Oliver, 410 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Pa.), afl'd mem.,
546 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 947 (1978); United States ex rel Tatman
v. Anderson, 391 F. Supp. 68 (D. Del. 1975); United States v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. 912
(M.D. Pa. 1972), afl'd in relevant part sub nom. United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d
Cir. 1973).
40. 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
41. Id. at 974. See text accompanying notes 196-223 infra.
42. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077
(1981); United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. McMichael,
492 F. Supp. 205 (D. Colo. 1980).
43. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. H, § 201(a), 84 Stat.
926 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976)); see text accompanying notes 132-56 infra.
44. Parliament passed the first immunity act in England in 1710. Intended to pro-
scribe gambling, the act provided that a loser could sue a winner to recover his losses, and
that the winner could be compelled to answer the loser's charges. Following the winner's
1670
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in 1857, initiated a precedent followed by many of the early immu-
nity acts: it was a broad rule written in reaction to a disturbing
political situation. In January 1857 the Washington correspondent
for the New York Times reported that he had been solicited by
members of the House of Representatives to act as an intermedi-
ary in a vote selling scheme.4' The correspondent, however, refused
to reveal the identity of those involved in the scheme to a House
investigating committee. 47 The committee responded by requesting
that the House pass a bill to compel the reporter to testify.48 Al-
though Congress passed 9 the 1857 Act"0 specifically to force the
recalcitrant reporter to testify, the statute extended immunity
response and the return of the loser's money, however, the winner was "acquitted, indemni-
fied and discharged from any further or other Punishment, Forfeiture or Penalty." An Act
for the better preventing of excessive and deceitful Gaming, 1710, 9 Anne, c. 14, § 4 (re-
pealed by An Act to amend the Law concerning Games and Wagers, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c.
109, § 15). Although not adopted by any American legislature, the gambler's immunity act
was held to be in effect in this country. United States v. Dixon, 25 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D.C.
1830) (No. 14,970).
45. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, § 2, 11 Stat. 155.
46. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Seas. 403-13 (1857).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 404. Congressman Orr of South Carolina introduced the proposed bill for the
committee.
49. Congress passed the Act two days after its introduction despite concern over the
necessity of this type of legislation and questions about its constitutional validity. The de-
bate focused on the investigation then in progress and the relationship of the bill to that
investigation. Id. at 426-27 (remarks of Reps. Grow and Davis). Some congressmen sought to
defeat or slow the passage of the bill by consigning it to another committee, but their mo-
tion was defeated by a vote of 132 to 71. Id. at 432-33. The bill was then passed by a vote of
183 to 12. Id. at 433. The Senate, notably the Committee on the Judiciary which discussed it
for a mere ten minutes, gave the bill only cursory consideration. Id. at 436 (remarks of Sen.
Hale). The Senate approved the bill by a vote of 46 to 3. Id. at 445.
50. The Act provides in pertinent part,
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, than [sic] no person examined and testifying
before either House of Congress, or any committee of either House, shall be held to
answer criminally in any court of justice, or subject to any penalty or forfeiture for any
fact or act touching which he shall be required to testify before either House of Con-
gress or any committee of either House as to which he shall have testified whether
before or after the date of this act, and that no statement made or paper produced by
any witness before either House of Congress or before any committee of either House,
shall be competent testimony in any criminal proceeding against such witness in any
court of justice; and no witness shall hereafter be allowed to refuse to testify to any fact
or to produce any paper touching which he shall be examined by either House of Con-
gress, or any committee of either House, for the reason that his testimony touching
such fact or the production of such paper may tend to disgrace him or otherwise render
him infamous: Provided, That nothing in this act shall be construed to exempt any
witness from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed by him in testifying
as aforesaid.
Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, § 2, 11 Stat. 155.
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from criminal sanctions to all witnesses before all congressional
committees concerning any matter about which they testified. 1
In its effort to create an effective method of compelling testi-
mony, Congress worded the 1857 Act so broadly that it was easily
abused. Because the statute granted immunity for all criminal acts
about which a congressional witness testified, many persons whom
Congress hoped to investigate were eager to testify. These wit-
nesses skillfully provoked a line of inquiry that allowed them to
establish a complete record of their crimes and thus secure broad
immunity. The most notable case of an abuse of the 1857 Act con-
cerned two clerks accused of embezzling two million dollars in In-
dian trust bonds from the Department of the Interior. 2 The clerks
managed to testify about the charge before a House investigatory
committee. When the Government then attempted to prosecute
them, the court dismissed the case on the ground that the clerks
had obtained immunity.53 Many congressmen reacted to this abuse
of the immunity statute in the embezzlement scandals by initiat-
ing a movement in Congress to modify the 1857 Act.55
B. The Immunity Act of 1862
In direct response to the Indian trust bond scandal, Congress
designed the 1862 Act56 to eliminate the excesses encouraged by
the imprecise wording of the 1857 Act. By altering the language 57
51. Significantly, the statute not only forbade the use of testimony, but it also immu-
nized "any fact or act" about which the witness testified. Id.
52. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3156, 3157 (1862).
53. See id.
54. For example, Senator Trumbull complained,
The statute of 1857 was passed hastily; we all recollect that it grew out of a partic-
ular matter, and was known to be imperfect when it passed. It has operated so as to
discharge from prosecution and punishment persons who were brought before these
committees and testified touching matters that they might have been prosecuted for. In
fact this holds out an inducement for the worst criminals to appear before our investi-
gating committees. Here is a man who stole two million in bonds, if you please, out of
the Interior Department. What does he do? He gets himself called as a witness before
one of the investigating committees and testifies something in relation to that matter,
and then he cannot be indicted.
Id. at 428 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull).
55. Id. at 364 (remarks of Rep. Wilson).
56. Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11, § 1, 12 Stat. 333.
57. The 1862 Act provides in pertinent part,
That the testimony of a witness examined and testifying before either House of Con-
gress, or any committee of either House of Congress, shall not be used as evidence in
any criminal proceeding against such witness in any court of justice: Provided, how-
ever, That no official paper or record, produced by such witness on such examination,
shall be held or taken to be included within the privilege of said evidence so to protect
1672 [Vol. 34:1665
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of the immunity statute Congress achieved two goals. First, the
scope of the immunity was narrowed to cover only the witness' oral
testimony to the committee. Illegal transactions revealed during
this testimony and papers and records produced by the witness
were no longer protected. Second, while the immune testimony
could not be used as the basis for prosecution, it could be used to
obtain additional evidence upon which prosecution could be based.
Thus, the immunity provision signed by President Lincoln" five
years after the first statute became law changed the full transac-
tional immunity to a much more limited use immunity. In the
words of Senator Benjamin F. Wade, this level of protection was
"all that a rascal ought to have at the hands of justice, even more
than he ought to have."59
C. The Immunity Act of 1868
Another political incident in 1868 provoked Congress to enact
an immunity act"° that amended the 1862 statute in one significant
respect. United States v. McRae 1 was a suit filed in England by
the United States to confiscate assets of the defunct Confederacy
located in English banks. In order to prevail in its case, the Gov-
ernment needed the testimony of persons who had acted as Con-
federate agents.2 One agent refused to testify on the grounds that
it would require him to forfeit property he owned in the United
States." In response to this refusal Senator Frelinghuysen intro-
duced a bill 64 modeled after the 1862 statute, but which broadened
the scope of the protection by immunizing court-given testimony.6 5
Congress evidently deemed the McRae case s sufficient justification
such witness from any criminal proceeding as aforesaid ....
Id.
58. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Seass. 506 (1862).
59. Id. at 429.
60. Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, § 1, 15 Stat. 37.
61. L.R. 3 Ch. 79 (App. 1867).
62. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Seas. 1334 (1868) (remarks of Rep. Williams).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 845.
65. The bill, as enacted, provides in pertinent part that
no answer or pleading of any party and no discovery, or evidence obtained by means of
any judicial proceeding from any party or witness in this or any foreign country, shall
be given in evidence, or in any manner used against such party or witness, or his prop-
erty or estate, in any court of the United States, or in any proceeding by or before any
officer of the United States, in respect to any crime, or for the enforcement of any
penalty or forfeiture ....
Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, § 1, 15 Stat. 37 (emphasis added).
66. Congressional reaction to McRae explains the otherwise inexplicable extension of
1981] 1673
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for the bill because it passed in both the House and the Senate67
following only minimal debate.68
Witnesses challenged the adequacy of the 1868 statute in the
lower federal courts as early as 1869. The case of In re Phillips"9
concerned a witness who had refused to respond to questions about
tax returns from tobacco manufacturers because of possible self-
incrimination. The court held that use immunity granted under
the authority of the 1868 statute provided sufficient protection
and, therefore, the court compelled the witness to testify.70 The
witness asserted that he was inadequately immunized because his
testimony could be used by the prosecution to discover new evi-
dence against him.71 The court responded to the witness' conten-
tion by adopting the following language from a New York case,
People v. Kelly:72
[N]either the law nor the [C]onstitution is so sedulous to screen the guilty as
the argument supposes. If a man cannot give evidence upon the trial of an-
other person without disclosing circumstances which will make his own guilt
apparent, or at least capable of proof, though his account of the transaction
should never be used as evidence, it is the misfortune of his condition, and
not any want of humanity in the law.7 3
Three more federal courts examined the 1868 Act between 1871
and 1883.74 In each case the court concluded that use immunity
afforded appropriate protection and upheld the statute based on
the principle of cessat ratio, cessat lex-where the reason of a law
or rule ceases, the law or rule itself ceases. For example, the Court
in United States v. Williams stated,
If the testimony or admission cannot be used by giving it directly in evidence
to the jury as an admission, or if it cannot, in any manner, be used against
statutory immunity to testimony given in judicial proceedings "in this or any foreign coun-
try." Id.
67. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1334 (1868).
68. In support of the proposal, Representative Williams of Pennsylvania stated, "This
testimony is important, and this bill is to put the party [the Confederate agent] in such
position that he shall be relieved from the liability to which he is now subject." Id. (remarks
of Rep. Williams).
69. 19 F. Cas. 506 (D. Va. 1869) (No. 11,097).
70. Id. at 507.
71. Id.
72. 24 N.Y. 74 (1861). Kelly concerned the constitutional adequacy of a state immu-
nity statute in a contempt action against a witness who refused to testify before a grand jury
investigating alleged bribery of New York city councilmen.
73. In re Phillips, 19 F. Cs. at 507 (quoting People v. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74, 83 (1861)).
74. United States v. Williams, 28 F. Cas. 670 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1872) (No. 16,717);
United States v. Farrington, 5 F. 343 (N.D.N.Y. 1881); United States v. Brown, 24 F. Cas.
1273 (D.C.D. Or. 1871) (No. 14,671).
[Vol. 34:1665
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the party, then it seems the great reason upon which the protection of
the witness rests has ceased to exist; and it is a well established principle, too
old to be combatted or denied, that where the reason of a law or rule ceases,
the law or rule itself ceases.75
The passage of the Interstate Commerce Act"6 in 1887 precipi-
tated Supreme Court review of the 1868 immunity statute. When
Congress created the Interstate Commerce Act, it vested the Inter-
state Commerce Commission with the authority to investigate and
eliminate discriminatory practices and excessive rates that pre-
vailed in interstate and foreign commerce. The Commission used
grants of immunity in its investigations to compel testimony con-
cerning corporate procedures and to compel production of relevant
business records. Authority for the Commission's use of immunity
came from the 1868 immunity statute and section 12 7 of the Inter-
state Commerce Act. Invariably, witnesses before the Commission
invoked the fifth amendment and refused to testify. Despite an
award of immunity, Charles Counselman, an interstate grain ship-
per under investigation for accepting rate kickbacks in violation of
the Interstate Commerce Act, refused to testify and was convicted
of contempt.7 18 Counselman petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
on the ground that the contempt proceeding was illegal. Following
the denial of his petition, Counselman appealed to the Supreme
Court claiming that the 1868 immunity statute violated the fifth
amendment.7 9 Counselman v. Hitchcock is significant not only be-
cause it was the first Supreme Court case to consider an immunity
statute, but also because it was only the second time that the
Court closely scrutinized the scope of the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination."
Before examining the validity of the 1868 immunity act, the
Court, speaking through Justice Blatchford, rejected the Govern-
ment's claim that Counselman could not assert the fifth amend-
75. 28 F. Cas. 670, 671 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1872) (No. 16,717).
76. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379.
77. Section 12 provided, "The claim that any such testimony or evidence may tend to
criminate the person giving such evidence shall not excuse such witness from testifying, but
such evidence or testimony shall not be used against such person on the trial of any criminal
proceeding." Id. § 12, 24 Stat. at 383.
78. In re Counselman, 44 F. 268 (C.C.N.D. II. 1890).
79. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 547-52 (1892).
80. The first Supreme Court ruling on the scope of the fifth amendment privilege oc-
curred in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), which invalidated § 5 of the Revenue
Act of 1874. Aaron Burr's treason trial, in which then Circuit Judge John Marshall approved
a witness' refusal to testify, was brought in the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia. See
text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
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ment privilege before a grand jury because the privilege applied
only to criminal trials.81 Instead, the Court noted, "The object [of
the privilege] was to insure that a person should not be compelled,
when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony
which might tend to show that he himself had committed a
crime. '82 The Court determined that while "[tihe privilege is lim-
ited to criminal matters, . . . it is as broad as the mischief against
which it seeks to guard."8 Upon examination of the 1868 immu-
nity provision, the Court concluded that although it proscribed the
use of a witness' testimony for purposes of conviction, the act did
not provide adequate protection from self-incrimination because
the prosecution could use the testimony to search for new evidence
with which to prosecute the witness. 84 In finding the scope of the
1868 Act insufficient in relation to the privilege, the Court framed
the constitutional standard by which future federal immunity stat-
utes would be judged: "The constitutional provision distinctly de-
clares that a person shall not 'be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself;' and the protection of [the 1868 stat-
ute] is not coextensive with the constitutional provision. Legisla-
tion cannot detract from the privilege afforded by the Constitu-
tion." 85 Although the Court declared the 1868 Act invalid, it did
not adopt the extreme view that the fifth amendment privilege
cannot be abridged in any respect by legislation such as an immu-
nity act. Rather, the Court suggested the opposite conclusion in an
allusive bit of dicta 6 which indicated that a properly worded im-
munity act would be upheld.
D. The Immunity Act of 1893
The invalidation of the 1868 immunity act by the Supreme
81. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. at 555-57.
82. Id. at 562.
83. Id.
84. Justice Blatchford stated,
It could not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony to search out other
testimony to be used in evidence against him or his property, in a criminal proceeding
in such court. It could not prevent the obtaining and the use of witnesses and evidence
which should be attributable directly to the testimony he might give under compulsion,
and on which he might be convicted, when otherwise, and if he had refused to answer,
he could not possibly have been convicted.
Id. at 564.
85. Id. at 564-65 (emphasis added).
86. "In view of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must
afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offence to the which the ques-
tion relates." Id. at 586.
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Court significantly curtailed the investigative and enforcement ac-
tivities of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Congress reacted
to the Counselman decision only sixteen days after it was an-
nounced when Senator Cullom, a staunch advocate of effective fed-
eral regulation of commerce, introduced a new immunity bill. 87 In
response to an objection that the bill would violate rights protected
by the Constitution, the Senator explained that he had closely ad-
hered to the Supreme Court's language in Counselman when draft-
ing the proposed legislation.88 Because of pressure to aid the Inter-
state Commerce Commission in its investigations, Congress passed
the bill and it was ready for President Benjamin Harrison's signa-
ture on February 11, 1893.89 The 1893 Act90 adopted a radically
different approach to immunity. Unlike the general immunity stat-
ute of 1868, which granted immunity in any judicial proceeding,
the 1893 Act only immunized evidence presented before the Inter-
state Commerce Commission or in proceedings brought under the
Interstate Commerce Act.91 Thus, with the 1893 Act, Congress
abandoned its practice of enacting general immunity legislation
and undertook a new policy, followed in subsequent immunity pro-
visions, of confining the immunity protection to actions brought
pursuant to a particular statute.
The 1893 Act underwent its first court test within one year of
87. Counselman was announced on January 11, 1892 and the new bill was introduced
on January 27, 1892. 23 CONG. REc. 573 (1892).
88. Id. at 6333. During the Senate debate Senator Cullom defended his bill by stating,
"Unless some such bill can be passed both the Interstate Commerce Commission and the
courts will be entirely unable to enforce the law upon the statute book in reference to inter-
state commerce." Id. (remarks of Sen. Cullom).
89. 24 CONG. REc. 1157-58, 1181, 1565 (1893).
90. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, § 1, 27 Stat. 443.
91. The relevant portions of the 1893 Act provide,
[N]o person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books,
papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements and documents before the Interstate Commerce
Commission, or in obedience to the subpoena of the Commission, whether such sub-
poena be signed or issued by one or more Commissioners, or in any cause or proceed-
ing, criminal or otherwise, based upon or growing out of any alleged violation of the act
of Congress, entitled, "An act to regulate commerce," approved February fourth, eigh-
teen hundred and eighty-seven, or of any amendment thereof on the ground or for the
reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him, may
tend to criminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no person shall be
prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transac-
tion, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence, documen-
tary or otherwise, before said Commission, or in obedience to its subpoena, or the sub-
poena of either of them, or in any such case or proceeding.
Id.
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its passage. In United States v. James9 2 two witnesses, James G.
James and Gordon McLeod, were cited for their refusal to testify
in a federal grand jury investigation brought pursuant to the Inter-
state Commerce Act. In bringing the contempt action, the Govern-
ment contended that the defendants could not assert the fifth
amendment privilege since they had immunity under the statute.93
Before reaching the question whether the 1893 immunity statute
was coextensive with the fifth amendment, the court examined the
history of the privilege94 and determined that the Framers of the
Constitution contemplated a right to "silence against the accusa-
tion of the federal government,-silence against the right of the
federal government to seek out data for an accusation." 5 The
court expressed concern that after testifying a witness could be ex-
posed to public disgrace and social retribution in addition to crimi-
nal prosecution 6 and concluded that "the privilege of silence,
against a criminal accusation, guarantied by the fifth amendment,
was meant to extend to all the consequences of disclosure. '97 The
court rpasoned that since the 1893 Act could not protect witnesses
from public embarrassment, it did not meet the coextensive test
established by the Supreme Court in Counselman and was there-
fore invalid. 8
In 1896 the Supreme Court addressed the 1893 immunity act
in Brown v. Walker,9 in which a witness 00 who had refused to
testify during a grand jury investigation of possible violations of
the Interstate Commerce Act was convicted of contempt. On ap-
92. 60 F. 257 (N.D. Ill. 1894).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 263.
95. Id. at 264.
96. The court observed,
The stated penalties and forfeitures of the law might be set aside; but was there no
pain in disfavor and odium among neighbors, in excommunication from church or soci-
eties that might be governed by prevailing views,. . . or in the unfathomable disgrace,
not susceptible of formulation in language, which a known violation of law brings upon
the offender?
Id.
97. Id. at 265.
98. Id. Alternatively, the court compared the act to a pardon and concluded that even
if the act were unconstitutional the witness had a right to refuse the immunity just as he
could refuse a pardon under the Marshall acceptance doctrine. See text accompanying notes
25-26 supra. The court's decision was not appealed.
99. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
100. Brown, an accountant for a railroad company, refused to answer questions about
rebates on the ground of possible self-incrimination despite a grant of immunity under the
1893 Act. Id. at 592.
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peal Brown contended that his testimony would subject him to
public humiliation and disgrace. The Supreme Court rejected his
argument and the district court's reasoning in United States v.
James and held that the Framers did not intend the fifth amend-
ment privilege to protect a witness' reputation and that the privi-
lege was unavailable to witnesses not subject to potential criminal
liability.101 Brown also argued that the 1893 immunity act did not
meet Counselman's coextensive test since it immunized him from
prosecution at the federal level but exposed him to prosecution in
the state courts. 102 The Court, however, stated that "[t]he act in
question contains no suggestion that it is to be applied only to the
Federal courts." 03 Moreover, the Court observed that even if the
immunity did not adequately protect against state prosecution, the
possibility of such an occurrence was "'a danger of an imaginary
and unsubstantial character' "o104 that did not invalidate the stat-
ute. Despite the constitutional arguments advanced by the Court,
pragmatic considerations such as the need for legislation to facili-
tate the enforcement of the Interstate Commerce Act may well
have motivated the Court to uphold the 1893 immunity act. In-
deed, the majority observed in conclusion that "[i]f. . . witnesses
standing in Brown's position were at liberty to set up an immunity
from testifying, the enforcement of the Interstate Commerce law or
other analogous acts, wherein it is for the interest of both parties
to conceal their misdoings, would become impossible ....
101. The Court stated,
[T]he fact that the testimony may tend to degrade the witness in public estimation
does not exempt him from the duty of disclosure. A person who commits a criminal act
is bound to contemplate the consequences of exposure to his good name and reputa-
tion, and ought not to call upon the courts to protect that which he has himself es-
teemed to be of such little value. . . . The design of the constitutional privilege is not
to aid the witness in vindicating his character, but to protect him against being com-
pelled to furnish evidence to convict him of a criminal charge. If he secure legal immu-
nity from prosecution, the possible impairment of his good name is a penalty which it
is reasonable he should be compelled to pay for the common good.
Id. at 605-06.
102. Id. at 606.
103. Id. at 607. The Court described the scope of the 1893 Act in the following terms:
"[Tihe immunity extends to any transaction, matter or thing concerning which [a witness]
may testify, which clearly indicates that the immunity is intended to be general, and to be
applicable whenever and in whatever court such prosecution may be had." Id. at 608 (em-
phasis in original).
104. Id. (quoting Queen v. Boyes, 121 Eng. Rep. 730, 730 (Q.B. 1861)).
105. Id. at 610. The dissenters opposed the majority's reliance on this argument:
Much stress was laid in the argument on the supposed importance of this provision
in enabling the commission and the courts to enforce the salutary provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act. This, at the best, is a dangerous argument, and should not
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E. The Immunity Acts of 1903 and 1906
Following Brown, Congress continued its piecemeal approach
of adopting immunity legislation as part of other federal regulatory
statutes and passed three new immunity provisions in 1903.106 In
1906 the Supreme Court upheld one of these acts10 7 in Hale v.
Henkel'08 in which a witness refused to testify before a grand jury
investigating antitrust violations. While the Court reaffirmed the
Brown analysis, it also considered the practical effects of immunity
legislation on law enforcement.10 9 After the Court upheld the act,
problems with its application arose in the celebrated "beef trust
case," United States v. Armour & Co. °10 The Justice Department
indicted the nation's leading meat packers for allegedly conspiring
to restrain and monopolize trade."1 The packers, however, claimed
immunity'12 as a result of informal discussions with the Commis-
sioner of Corporations who had conducted a contemporaneous in-
vestigation of the same activities of the companies. In response the
Government contended, first, that the requisite formalities of sub-
poena and oath had not been followed 1 ' and, second, that since
be listened to by a court, to the detriment of the constitutional rights of the citizen.
Id. at 627 (Shiras, J., dissenting).
106. Act of Feb. 25, 1903, ch. 755, § 1, 32 Stat. 854, 904 (making appropriations for the
legislative, executive, and judicial expenses of the government); Act of Feb. 19, 1903, ch. 708,
§ 3, 32 Stat. 847, 848-49 (further regulating commerce with foreign nations and among the
states); Act of Feb. 14, 1903, ch. 552, § 6, 32 Stat. 825, 828 (establishing the Department of
Commerce and Labor).
107. Act of Feb. 25, 1903, ch. 755, 32 Stat. 854, 903-04. This Act authorized $500,000
for special counsel and agents in the office of the Attorney General to enforce certain com-
merce and antitrust laws. The Act provided,
That no person shall be prosecuted or be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or
on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may testify or
produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, in any proceeding, suit, or prosecution
under said Acts: Provided further, That no person so testifying shall be exempt from
prosecution or punishment for perjury. ...
Id. at 904.
108. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
109. The Court observed,
As the combination or conspiracies provided against by the Sherman Anti Trust Act
can ordinarily be proved only by testimony of parties thereto, in the person of their
agents or employes the privilege claimed would practically nullify the whole act of Con-
gress. Of what use would it be for the legislature to declare these combinations unlaw-
ful if the judicial power may close the door of access to every available source of infor-
mation upon the subject?
Id. at 70.
110. 142 F. 808 (N.D. Ill. 1906).
111. Id. at 817.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 823-24.
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the disclosures had been essentially voluntary, they acted as a
waiver of both the privilege and immunity.114 The district court
found no immunity for the corporation,115 but upheld the immu-
nity of the individual defendants.1 The Armour decision pro-
voked a special Presidential message to Congress in which Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt charged that the decision weakened the
antitrust law and urged Congress to clarify the limited scope of the
immunity statute.1 Congress responded1 8 with the 1906 Act,
which confined protection under the 1893 and the three 1903 im-
munity statutes to natural persons who, under oath, testified or
produced documentary or other evidence in compliance with a
subpoena.1 9
F. The Immunity Act of 1954
Congress did not fully reexamine the immunity statutes until
1954 when the issue arose in response to the political climate of
the McCarthy hearings on alleged Communist Party activities and
the Kefauver Committee hearings on organized crime. Confronted
with scores of witnesses 120 asserting the fifth amendment,12 1 several
congressmen began to agitate for a method of preventing what
they viewed as abuse of the privilege. In May 1951 Senator McCar-
ron proposed a bill amending the 1862 immunity act,122 the only
extant immunity statute applicable to congressional investigations
in 1951. s12 Following three years of debate,12 4 Senator McCarron's
114. Id.
115. Id at 817.
116. Id. at 827. The court recognized that a finding of testimonial compulsion was a
prerequisite to a grant of immunity, but it found such compulsion despite the lack of sub-
poena or oath. Id. at 822-25.
117. Pa sIDENT's MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, APRIL 18, 1906, H.R. Doc. No. 706, 59th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1906).
118. 40 CONG. REc. 7657-58 (1906) (remarks of Sen. Knox supporting the new bill).
Other senators argued that the greatest benefit might be obtained by repealing all immunity
acts. See, e.g., id. (remarks of Sen. Daniel).
119. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3920, § 1, 34 Stat. 798.
120. The fifth amendment privilege was asserted by 317 witnesses before congressional
committees in 1953 alone. D. FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TODAY 329 (1976).
121. Cases such as Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950), and Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951), affirmed the right of witnesses to claim the fifth amendment
privilege in various governmental inquiries, including congressional investigations.
122. Originally enacted as Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11, § 1, 12 Stat. 333.
123. 97 CONG. REC. 5972 (1951).
124. Several opponents of the bill believed it allowed Congress to take over the law
enforcement function of the executive branch. 99 CONG. REC. 8342-43 (1953) (remarks of
Sen. Lehman). Even the bill's supporters recommended that strong procedural safeguards
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argument that his bill would combat the threat of "the Communist
consipracy' 2 triumphed, and both the House and the Senate
passed the bill by overwhelming majorities.12 e The 1954 Act gave
authority to immunize witnesses to congressional committees,
grand juries, and courts, but it applied only to investigations of
internal security threats and required express approval of the At-
torney General and a United States District Court as a condition
precedent to the grant of immunity.127
In 1956 the new immunity provision received its first court
test in Ullmann v. United States,12 a case concerning a grand jury
witness who had refused to testify regarding his knowledge of an
alleged wartime spying ring and his membership in the Communist
Party. Ullmann appealed his contempt conviction alleging that the
1954 Act was distinguishable from the immunity statute upheld in
Brown v. Walker. 29 He attacked the constitutionality of the Act
on the ground that "the impact of the disabilities imposed by fed-
eral and state authorities and the public in general-such as loss of
jobs, expulsion from labor unions, state registration and investiga-
tion statutes, passport eligibility, and general public oppro-
brium-is so oppressive that the statute does not give . . . true
immunity."'' 30 Speaking through Justice Frankfurter, the Court
quickly rejected Ullmann's disability argument, reaffirmed Brown
v. Walker, and upheld the 1954 Act.' 3'
be incorporated into it. Id. at 4738 (remarks of Sen. Kefauver). One Senator argued that
"[w]hen for reasons of expediency or emergency, we weaken. . . individual rights and give
inordinate powers or emergency powers to any branch of our Government, it is the record of
history that at last that power will be used wrongfully, will be used unwisely, or against
innocent individuals." Id. at 8349-50 (remarks of Sen. Cooper).
125. The following is an excerpt from Senator McCarron's defense of his proposal on
May 6, 1953:
[Llegislation of this nature is urgently needed, especially in connection with investiga-
tions conducted by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, dealing with national
security and the threat of the Communist conspiracy. If this bill becomes law, it will go
a long way . . . to help expose the Communist conspiracy in this country.
Id. at 4737 (remarks of Sen. McCarron).
126. 100 CONG. REc. 13333, 13997 (1954).
127. Act of Aug. 20, 1954, ch. 769, § 1, 68 Stat. 745 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3486
(1976)).
128. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
129. Id. at 430.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 430-31, 432-34, 439. The Court observed that "the immunity granted need
only remove those sanctions which generate the fear justifying invocation of the privilege."
Id. at 431.
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G. The Current Immunity Act
The origin of the present immunity provision lies in Murphy
v. Waterfront Commission,1 32 which posed the problem of in-
terjurisdictional immunity and caused the Supreme Court to re-
consider its position that only transactional immunity met the co-
extensive test. The defendants in Murphy had refused to testify at
a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission of New York
Harbor concerning waterfront work itoppages1ss despite grants of
immunity from prosecution in both New York and New Jersey134
because they feared incrimination under federal law. According to
the Court, the case raised the issue "whether one jurisdiction
within our federal structure may compel a witness, whom it has
immunized from prosecution under its laws, to give testimony
which might then be used to convict him of a crime against an-
other such jurisdiction.113 5 The Murphy holding on this issue is
quite noteworthy: "[W]e hold the constitutional rule to be that a
state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may
be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony
and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in
connection with a criminal prosecution against him."" 8 In contrast
to the absolute transactional immunity required by Counselman,
Murphy narrowed the scope of required protection so that wit-
nesses were not totally immunized.
Because of rapidly expanding organized crime activities
throughout the country during the 1960s, 1'7 the National Commis-
132. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
133. Id. at 53.
134. The Commission was a bi-state body established under an interstate agreement
approved by Congress. Id. at 53 n.2.
135. Id. at 53. The Court observed in a footnote that "[s]ince the privilege is not fully
applicable to the State and to the Federal Government, the basic issue is the same whether
the testimony is compelled by the Federal Government and used by a State, or compelled
by a State and used by the Federal Government." Id. at 53 n.1.
136. Id. at 79 (emphasis added). The Court further elaborated on its new exclusionary
rule in a footnote by stating that "[o]nce a defendant demonstrates that he has testified,
under a state grant of immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecution, the federal
authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted by establishing
that they had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence." Id. at 79 n.18.
137. Congressmen and other public officials expressed their concern to congressional
committees investigating possible courses of action to fight the crime wave. As Attorney
General John N. Mitchell observed, "Over the last four decades, a criminal minority has put
together in the United States an organization which is both an illicit cartel and a nationwide
confederation, operating with comparative immunity from our criminal laws, and in deroga-
tion of our traditional concepts of free enterprise." Hearings on S. 30 Before Subcomm. No.
3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 27, at 152 (1970).
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sion on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws proposed a general im-
munity law to aid the Government in assembling evidence against
organized crime. 138 Congress quickly followed the Commission's
recommendation and enacted a comprehensive organized crime
control act, which included the present immunity statute.3'3 Before
the passage of the current immunity act, federal immunity provi-
sions were scattered throughout fifty-seven separate statutes 4 ° and
138. The Commission included an exhaustive study of federal witness immunity law in
its proposal for a general reorganization of federal criminal law and submitted to Congress a
tentative immunity provision that served as a model for the legislation eventually adopted.
Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (2d Interim Re-
port, Mar. 19, 1969), in Hearings on H.R. 11157 and H.R. 12041 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14, at 36 (1969).
139. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. II, § 201(a), 84
Stat. 926 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976)). This Note focuses on §§ 6002 and
6003, which read as follows:
§ 6002. Immunity generally
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination,
to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee
or a subcommittee of either House, and the person presiding over the proceeding com-
municates to the witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to
comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no
testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly
or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against
the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false state-
ment, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
§ 6003. Court and grand jury proceedings
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or pro-
vide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the United
States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district court for the
judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in accordance
with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the United States attorney for
such district, an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other
information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this
part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General, the
Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General, request an
order under subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to
the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other
information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
Section 6001 contains definitions of terms used in the act, § 6004 authorizes grants of immu-
nity to witnesses in certain administrative proceedings, and § 6005 authorizes grants of im-
munity to individuals who testify in congressional hearings.
140. For an index of the 57 federal immunity statutes amended or repealed by the
1970 Act, see Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 202-260, 84 Stat.
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they usually granted limited authority to specific federal agencies.
Designed to consolidate the immunity statutes into a single law
and prevent the problem of "immunity baths,"-"- the 1970 Act re-
pealed all federal transactional immunity statutes142 and estab-
lished "use and derivative use" immunity1 43 as the new standard of
protection granted at the federal level.
Although a number of lower federal courts found that the new
use immunity provided inadequate witness protection, 1 4  in 1972
the Supreme Court upheld the statute against constitutional at-
tack in Kastigar v. United States.14 5 The Court based its decision
on two arguments. First, it concluded that both the "reasoning"
and "result" of Murphy overruled Counselman.4 Second, it found
that use immunity adequately protects a witness by shifting to the
922, 928-32 (1970) (prior to amendment).
141. The term "immunity bath" refers to the situation that resulted when witnesses
testifying under transactional immunity statutes obtained absolute immunity for themselves
and their confederates. The legislative history of § 6002 contained in H.R. REP. No. 1549,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4017,
specifically states, "The proposal is not an immunity bath." Thus, it is clear that Congress
intended to limit the extent of immunity. The legislative history continues,
Title II is a general Federal immunity statute that will afford "use" immunity rather
than "transaction" immunity when a witness before a court, grand jury, Federal
agency, either House of Congress, or a congressional committee or subcommittee, as-
serts his privilege against self-incrimination. It is contemplated that the title will en-
able effective displacement of the privilege against self-incrimination by granting pro-
tection coextensive with the privilege; that is, protection against the use of compelled
testimony directly or indirectly against the witness in a criminal proceeding.
Id.
142. The repeal of all statutory authority for transactional immunity grants was not
complete until December 15, 1974, the effective date for the repeal of Act of June 19, 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 216, a frequently used transactional immunity provision.
143. Derivative use immunity is "use-plus-fruits" immunity, which prevents the use of
compelled testimony to develop or try a case against a previously immunized witness. This
Note will employ the term "use" immunity to include "use and derivative use" immunity.
144. E.g., United States v. Cropper, 454 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1971) (use immunity stat-
utes are inadequate bases for compelling a witness to testify over a claim of privilege);
United States v. McDaniel, 449 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1971) (federal government cannot obtain
grand jury testimony of witness who pleaded the fifth amendment before a state grand jury
and was compelled to testify unless it grants the witness transactional immunity); United
States ex reL. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1971) (New Jersey statute that fails to
grant transactional immunity is an inadequate basis for compelling unwilling witness to in-
criminate himself); In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1971) (language of fifth amendment
requires grant of full transactional immunity and Congress is powerless under Constitution
to circumvent that requirement by legislation).
145. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). In a companion case to Kastigar, Zicarelli v. New Jersey
State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972), the Court upheld a state statute provid-
ing for use immunity. Since Zicarelli, a substantial number of states have changed from
transactional to use immunity.
146. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 458.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
government the "heavy burden" of proving not only that any sub-
sequent prosecution is untainted by the immunized testimony, but
also that the evidence it intends to use is derived from legitimate
sources independent of the compelled testimony.1, 7 Writing for the
majority, Justice Powell stated,
[S]uch immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of
the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel
testimony over a claim of privilege. While a grant of immunity must afford
protection commensurate with that afforded by the privilege, it need not be
broader. Transactional immunity, which accords full immunity from prosecu-
tion for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the wit-
ness considerably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege .... The broad language in Counselman . .. was unnecessary to the
Court's decision, and cannot be considered binding authority.'4 8
Only Justices Douglas and Marshall believed the statute impermis-
sibly limited the scope of immunity.149 Even though the composi-
tion of the Court has changed since the Kastigar decision, only two
current justices are on record against use immunity.15 0 Given the
conservative leaning of the present Court, it appears unlikely that
the Court will reverse its position on use immunity in the near
future.
Executive pardons 51 and transactional immunity grants 52
were infrequently used as means of compelling testimony. In con-
trast, since the passage of the 1970 Act and its affirmation in Kas-
tigar, use immunity has become one of the most valuable and
widely utilized investigatory tools available to the prosecution. In-
deed, a recent Justice Department survey revealed that from De-
cember 14, 1970, the effective date of the current immunity stat-
ute, through fiscal year 1978, federal prosecutors submitted 10,246
requests to immunize a total of 24,344 witnesses.1 53 Only rarely
147. Id. at 460-61.
148. Id. at 453-55.
149. Id. at 462 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Id. at 467 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
150. Only Justices Douglas and Marshall dissented in Kastigar. Justices Brennan and
Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Justice Brennan, how-
ever, had previously opposed use immunity in Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 552
(1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151. See text accompanying notes 19-26 supra.
152. According to a 1974 publication, more witnesses were immunized during the first
10 months after the 1970 act became effective than during the preceding 50 years, when
transactional immunity was the only form of witness immunity available. NATIONAL LAw-
YER's GUILD, REPRESENTATION OF WITNESSES BEFORE FEDERAL GRAND JURIES: A MANUAL FOR
ATTORNEYS ch. 13, at 52 (1974).
153. Mykkeltvedt, United States v. Alessio-Due Process of Law and Federal Grants
of Witness Immunity for Defense Witnesses, 31 MERCER L. REV. 689, 692 (1980).
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during this period did the Attorney General or the appropriate as-
sistant attorney general deny requests for compulsion orders. 1 5 Al-
though only approximately one-half of the witnesses that govern-
ment prosecutors sought to immunize were compelled to testify
under a grant of immunity,155 undoubtedly the unused authoriza-
tions were helpful to the prosecution."' s Thus, the Justice Depart-
ment survey presents clear evidence that the 1970 immunity stat-
ute and the Kastigar decision have greatly aided federal
prosecutors in investigating criminal activity.
III. DIVERGENT APPROACHES OF LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
The impact of grants of statutory immunity on the federal
criminal justice system is evidenced by the dramatic increase in
immunity requests since the Supreme Court held in Kastigar that
use immunity is coextensive with the fifth amendment. The execu-
tive branch's discretionary power to grant immunity highlights the
conflicting roles of the Government as prosecutor. First, the prose-
cutor is an advocate with the responsibility to obtain a conviction
against the defendant. Second, the prosecutor is a guardian of jus-
tice with the responsibility to seek the truth and to secure the
"correct" decision-whether that decision be guilt or innocence. As
the Government has increased its reliance on immunity as a
prosecutorial tool, defense attorneys have challenged the unfet-
tered discretion of the prosecutor and have asserted that the de-
fendant must be accorded the means to secure immunity for his
witnesses when the prosecutor refuses to honor requests to immu-
nize these witnesses. Because the Supreme Court has not yet spe-
cifically ruled on the question of federal grants of immunity for
defense witnesses, 15 7 lower federal courts have employed inconsis-
154. Id. Only 104 requests for orders compelling a total of 201 witnesses to testify were
denied from December 14, 1970, to April 30, 1977. Id. at 692 n.19. Approximately 8,500
requests to immunize over 21,000 witnesses were submitted during this period. Id.
155. Id. at 692.
156. Conceivably, a defendant might agree to plea bargain when he learns that one of
his comrades, whose testimony would be particularly revealing, is about to receive
immunity.
157. Recently the Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in another case deal-
ing with the defense witness immunity issue. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981). This case is discussed in text accompanying notes
251-68 infra.
While the Supreme Court has not announced a firm decision on this question, an inter-
esting dictum in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), provides encouragement that
the Court may well support immunity for defense witnesses. The Court stated,
The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and
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tent analyses and have reached conflicting results when consider-
ing this issue.
A. The Expansive Approach
In Earl v. United States155 the Government charged James
Earl with narcotics violations based on an identification of Earl by
Frank Scott. When Earl attempted to call Scott as a defense wit-
ness, seeking his testimony that he had never known Earl and had
confused him with another man, Scott asserted his fifth amend-
ment privilege. Defendant then requested that either the prosecut-
ing attorney or the federal district court grant Scott immunity
under the statute 59 then in effect, but both rejected his motion.
Following his conviction, Earl contended on appeal that the court's
refusal to grant immunity to his witness violated his due process
rights.100 Judge Burger's brief opinion stated that only the legisla-
tive branch could create immunity laws and, therefore, the courts
did not have the power to satisfy his request."" An equally divided
circuit court denied per curiam Earl's petition for rehearing en
banc. 16 2 In a separate statement, however, Judge Leventhal argued
that the court's holding that it was powerless to create a defense
witness immunity procedure did not respond to Earl's claim of an
unfair trial.6e Because the court had made no finding that immu-
nizing Scott would result in actual harm to prosecutorial inter-
ests,0 Judge Leventhal concluded that the questions of due pro-
cess and judicial power in the context of immunity grants were
"likely to recur" and thus, deserved further consideration." 5
Judge Leventhal's opinion that Earl had not resolved the de-
comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be
founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the
judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the
facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is
imperative to the function of the courts that compulsory process be available for the
production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense.
Id. at 709 (emphasis added).
158. 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing denied, 364 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en
banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
159. Act of July 18, 1956, ch. 629, tit. II, § 201, 70 Stat. 574 (repealed 1970).
160. Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d at 534.
161. Id.
162. Earl v. United States, 364 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc) (per curiam).
163. Id. (Leventhal, J., joined by Bazelon, C.J., Fahy & Wright, JJ., dissenting from
denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 667.
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fense witness immunity issue was quite accurate. Perhaps without
fully appreciating its potential impact, Judge Burger had included
a footnote in his opinion that stated in part,
We might have quite different, and more difficult, problems had the Govern-
ment in this case secured testimony from one eyewitness by granting him
immunity while declining to seek an immunity grant for Scott to free him
from possible incrimination to testify for Earl. That situation would vividly
dramatize an argument on behalf of Earl that the statute as applied denied
him due process. Arguments could be advanced that in the particular case the
Government could not use the immunity statute for its advantage unless
Congress made the same mechanism available to the accused.16'
Judge Burger's footnote served to encourage defense attorneys in
later cases to move for grants of immunity for their witnesses. For
example, in three cases arising in the Ninth Circuit, the defense
attorneys cited the Earl footnote as authority for the view that the
prosecution must grant immunity to defense witnesses in order to
meet due process requirements. 16 7 Even though no government
witnesses testified under immunity, since the government could
have used immunity grants to support its position, the defense at-
torneys argued that they should have the same option. The Ninth
Circuit rejected this contention and uniformly held that the Earl
footnote applied only, if at all, when the prosecution itself usedimmunity to compel testimony.18s Furthermore, in each case the
court reaffirmed Judge Burger's separation of powers analysis of
the issue.
United States v. Alessio 69 ultimately presented the Ninth
Circuit with the fact situation raised hypothetically in the Earl
footnote. In Alessio the prosecution obtained immunity for one of
its witnesses, but refused to immunize three defense witnesses who
subsequently declined to testify on fifth amendment grounds. On
appeal the defendant alleged that the failure to grant immunity to
his witnesses denied him due process under the fifth amendment
and compulsory process under the sixth amendment.170 The court
agreed that under certain circumstances the prosecution's refusal
to immunize defense witnesses could violate due process, but it
166. Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d at 534 n.1 (emphasis in original).
167. United States v. Bautista, 509 F.2d 675 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976
(1975); Cerda v. United States, 488 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Jenkins, 470
F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 920 (1973).
168. United States v. Bautista, 509 F.2d 675, 677-78 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
976 (1975); Cerda v. United States, 488 F.2d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Jen-
kins, 470 F.2d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 920 (1973).
169. 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
170. Id. at 1081.
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held that because the evidence Alessio sought from his three wit-
nesses was cumulative in nature, the absence of their additional
testimony did not deprive him of a fair trial. 17 After only cursory
consideration of Alessio's sixth amendment claim, the court re-
jected it on separation of powers grounds. The court observed,
"The right to compulsory process. . . must be exercised consistent
with the government's power to determine which cases will be
prosecuted."'71 7 Thus, while the Ninth Circuit hastily dismissed the
compulsory process argument, it approved the proposition that de-
nial of defense witness immunity could result in unfairness if (1)
the government immunized its own witnesses in order to obtain
their testimony, and (2) the government refused to immunize a re-
luctant defense witness whose potential testimony the court
thought essential to an effective defense.
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, which merely acknowledged
the right of defendants to immunize their witnesses, in a series of
cases, the Third Circuit not only rejected the Earl analysis but also
voiced strong support for defense witness immunity. Beginning in
1976 with a case concerning prosecutorial misconduct, the court in-
dicated a willingness to reverse a conviction when the state refused
to grant immunity to a defense witness. In United States v. Morri-
son 173 a defense witness planned to testify that she, rather than the
defendant, had been involved in a conspiracy to sell hashish. The
witness apparently believed that she could not be prosecuted for
her role in the conspiracy because the Government had dropped
the federal charges against her when it learned that she was under
eighteen years old when the alleged offense occurred. 4 When the
trial began the district court stated that it would warn the witness
prior to her testimony against an unknowing waiver of her right
against self-incrimination. The prosecutor, however, apparently
171. Id. at 1082.
172. Id. at 1081-82. The court further noted,
To interpret the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as conferring on the defendant the
power to demand immunity for co-defendants, potential co-defendants, or others whom
the government might in its discretion wish to prosecute would unacceptably alter the
historic role of the Executive Branch in criminal prosecutions. Of course, whatever the
power the government possesses may not be exercised in a manner which denies the
defendant the due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. The footnote in Earl
v. United States ... on which appellant relies heavily says no more than this. The key
question, then, is whether appellant was denied a fair trial because of the government's
refusal to seek immunity for defense witnesses.
Id. at 1082.
173. 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976).
174. Id. at 225.
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felt that the warning would not provide adequate notice and,
therefore, he sent her three messages warning that she could still
be charged as a juvenile in state court, that her testimony could be
used as evidence against her, and that she could be charged with
perjury on the federal level since she was now eighteen. 175 In addi-
tion to these indirect threats, the prosecutor subpoenaed the wit-
ness, and in his office, under highly intimidating circumstances,716
again warned her of the potential dangers of testifying. As a result,
when called at trial the witness refused to answer a number of
questions 17 7 and the defendant was convicted.
On appeal the Third Circuit noted that the prosecutor's ac-
tions were completely unnecessary because the district court had
promised to advise the witness of her rights and, in fact, did warn
her at the appropriate time.17 18 Consequently, the overzealous ac-
tions of the prosecutor interfered with the witness' voluntary deci-
sion to testify and impaired the defendant's constitutional rights
to have the witness give evidence in his favor. 19 The court next
questioned whether the availability of use immunity would enable
the Government to cure the sixth amendment violation it had com-
mitted. The court found that certain circumstances may require
the Government to request use immunity for a defense witness,
and that the prosecutorial misconduct in the instant case had cre-
ated such a situation. 80 The court, therefore, remanded the case
with instructions that the Government either grant the witness use
immunity or suffer a judgment of acquittal. 8'
The Morrison court, however, did not specify the burden a de-
fendant must meet in order to obtain such drastic relief. The scope
of the defendant's burden in this respect was not established until
United States v. Herman.18 2 Herman, an elected Pennsylvania
magistrate, was convicted of accepting kickbacks on bail bond pre-
miums in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
175. Id.
176. In the prosecutor's office the witness was surrounded by three police officers who
had served as undercover agents in the case and whose testimony she would allegedly under-
mine in court. Id. at 226.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 228. The Third Circuit noted that although as a general rule there is no
duty to advise a witness of his right not to incriminate himself, it is nevertheless proper for
a court in its discretion to issue such warnings. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 229.
181. Id.
182. 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).
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Organizations statute.'83 Although Herman subpoenaed six of his
constables to testify in his favor,28 4 four indicated they would re-
fuse to testify on fifth amendment grounds. The prosecution and
district court subsequently denied Herman's request for immunity
for his witnesses. 85 The Government, however, immunized two
prosecution witnesses, a former bailbondsman and a secretary at
the bond agency, who testified that Herman had received the
kickbacks. 8 '
On appeal the Third Circuit reviewed Herman's immunity
claim and concluded that his constitutional rights were not vio-
lated. The court specifically noted "our governmental system's
strong tradition of deference to prosecutorial discretion" in the
context of immunity grants. 87 The court also acknowledged the
"tendency of the executive branch to exercise that discretion in
ways that make it more likely that defendants will be con-
victed."' Nevertheless, the Herman court recognized that a due
process violation may require dismissal in certain circumstances
when the prosecutor refuses to grant immunity. The court outlined
the dimensions of the defendant's burden: "[W]e think that the
evidentiary showing required to justify reversal on that ground
must be a substantial one. The defendant must be prepared to
show that the government's decisions were made with the deliber-
ate intention of distorting the judicial fact finding process."'"8
Thus, with complete recognition that a court seriously invades the
province of the executive when it orders the government to grant
statutory immunity to a defense witness, Herman nonetheless af-
firmed the availability of the immunity-or-dismissal remedy. The
majority, however, established a narrow test and conditioned the
grant of this remedy on a substantial showing of prosecutorial mis-
conduct by the defendant. Accordingly, absent prosecutorial mis-
conduct a defendant is foreclosed from insisting on immunity for
his witnesses under the Herman rationale. In Herman the court
183. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976).
184. Herman relied on prior admissions made by the constables to the FBI and the
grand jury and represented to the court that their testimony would establish that they had
received kickbacks, but had not shared the money with him or informed him of their illegal
activity. United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d at 1199.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1195.
187. Id. at 1203.
188. Id. at 1204.
189. Id.
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found no evidence of "distortion" or prosecutorial misconduct, 190
and, therefore, did not invoke the remedy of immunity or
dismissal.
In addition to the statutory immunity discussed above, Her-
man suggested the availability of still another form of immunity
derived from a court's inherent power. The court observed,
[W]hile we think that the court has no power to order a remedial grant of
statutory immunity to a defense witness absent a showing of unconstitutional
abuse, a case might be made that the court has inherent authority to effectu-
ate the defendant's compulsory process right by conferring a judicially fash-
ioned immunity upon a witness whose testimony is essential to an effective
defense.' 91
Judicial immunity differs from statutory immunity in two respects.
First, judicial immunity is necessitated not because of prosecu-
torial misconduct or intentional distortion of the trial process, but
because the defendant is prevented from presenting exculpatory
evidence vital to his case. Second, the court decrees immunity
rather than issuing an order requiring the prosecution to provide
statutory immunity. While the Herman court recognized that
problems could arise if courts decreed immunity,19 2 it justified such
use of judicial power on the basis of the "due process right to have
clearly exculpatory evidence presented to the jury, at least when
there is no strong countervailing systemic interest that justifies its
exclusion."' 93 The majority, however, merely recognized the availa-
bility of judicial immunity without invoking it in the instant case
because the issue was neither raised in the district court nor dis-
cussed in the briefs or at oral argument on appeal. T4 The court
explicitly left the issue to be decided by future cases and observed
that "[i]f such inherent power is to be recognized and standards
formulated for its exercise, that task should be performed in a case
where the issue was presented by the defendant, and perhaps by
the court sitting in [sic] banc.' '195
The Third Circuit did not wait long before Virgin Islands v.
190. The court found that the prosecutor's decision to immunize the two government
witnesses was unrelated to the decisions to prosecute and, later, to drop the charges against
the constables. Id.
191. Id. (emphasis added).
192. The court noted that the "existence vel non of such immunity power, and the
standards which should govern its invocation and exercise, raise a host of difficult issues. It
may be, for example, that such grants of immunity would on some occasions unduly inter-
fere with important interests of the prosecution." Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1204-05.
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Smith 96 presented it with an appropriate case for resolution of the
judicial immunity issue in its jurisdiction. Smith concerned four
juvenile defendants charged with robbery. In a statement to the
police, Ernesto Sanchez incriminated defendant Smith and implic-
itly exculpated the other three defendants. 9 7 These three code-
fendants called Sanchez as a defense witness with the expectation
that his testimony would parallel his earlier statement to the po-
lice.'98 Sanchez, however, asserted his fifth amendment privilege
and refused to testify. After they failed in their attempt to admit
his prior police statement into evidence, 99 the codefendants
sought to have the witness immunized. The Virgin Islands Attor-
ney General, who had exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute both the
defendants and the witness, agreed to grant immunity, but he con-
ditioned the grant as a matter of "prosecutorial courtesy" on ap-
proval by the United States attorney, who inexplicably failed to
consent.200 Without the benefit of Sanchez' testimony, all four de-
fendants were convicted of robbery. Speaking through Judge
Garth,201 the Third Circuit reversed the convictions202 and re-
manded the case for a determination of whether immunity should
have been conferred under standards explained in its opinion.
The court first considered its power to order the prosecution
to grant statutory immunity to a defense witness. Relying on the
prosecutorial misconduct standard previously articulated in Her-
man, the court held that statutory immunity is available to a de-
fense witness with relevant testimony20 when the defendant can
196. 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
197. Id. at 966-67.
198. Id. at 967.
199. The codefendants asserted an exception to the hearsay rule and claimed that
Sanchez had become an unavailable witness. The Government opposed the introduction of
the earlier statement made to the police on the ground that it would be unable to cross-
examine the hearsay declarant, Sanchez. The trial court sustained the Government's objec-
tion. Id.
200. Id.
201. Judge Garth filed a separate opinion in United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191,
1205 (3d Cir. 1978) (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 913 (1979).
202. The court affirmed defendant Smith's conviction because he could not have bene-
fited from Sanchez' testimony. Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 967-68.
203. The court observed in a footnote that the witness' testimony need not be "clearly
exculpatory or otherwise essential to the defendant's case" in order for the court to order
statutory immunity. Id. at 969 n.7. The court then quoted Morrison for the view that
"'where the Government has prevented the defendant's witness from testifying freely before
the jury, it cannot be held that the jury would not have believed the testimony or that the
error is harmless.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 228 (3d Cir.
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demonstrate that the prosecution opposed the immunity grant
"with the deliberate intention of distorting the factfinding pro-
cess."204 The court observed that the United States attorney's fail-
ure to consent to Sanchez' grant of immunity was "apparently inti-
mately involved" with the prosecution's trial strategy. 0 5 The court
attached great significance to the United States attorney's failure
to give any justification for his refusal to consent to the immunity
grant despite his lack of jurisdiction over Sanchez. According to
the court, this action suggested that the Government "deliberately
intended to keep this highly relevant, and possibly exculpatory, ev-
idence from the jury."2 0
The Third Circuit then considered the judicial immunity issue
left unresolved in Herman. Unlike the defendants in Herman, the
defendants in Smith had properly presented the issue207 and the
circuit court eagerly addressed it. The court held that under cer-
tain circumstances a defendant's due process right to present ex-
culpatory evidence may require a judicial grant of immunity for a
defense witness. The court found support for this holding in
Chambers v. Mississippi.20 8 The Supreme Court in Chambers held
that the state prosecutor's strict adherence to the state rules of
evidence prevented the defendant from introducing exculpatory
evidence, violated his due process right to present an effective de-
fense, and therefore required a new trial.209 Based on the record in
Smith, the Third Circuit concluded that the exclusion of Sanchez'
exculpatory testimony did not differ substantially from the due
process violation in Chambers.210 The court noted that the basic
constitutional doctrine of the right to present an effective defense
1976)). The court concluded that the trial court must find that the witness' testimony would
be relevant to the defendant's case. Id.
204. Id. at 969.
205. Id. First, the court noted that the prosecution realized its case was inherently
weak because it depended on the robbery victim's testimony. The court observed in a foot-
note that the victim was mentally retarded and also had physical ailments. Id. at 969 n.6.
Consequently, his trial testimony was often confusing and difficult to comprehend. Id. Fur-
thermore, Sanchez' testimony would severely damage the prosecution's case against three of
the defendants. Second, the court remarked that the refusal of consent to the immunity
grant not only prevented Sanchez from testifying, but also supported the Government's ob-
jection to the admission of his prior police statement. The Government based its objection
on its inability to cross-examine the hearsay declarant about his prior statement. Id. at 969.
206. Id.
207. The court sua sponte directed all parties to file supplemental briefs addressed
specifically to this issue before the oral argument. Id. at 970 n.8.
208. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
209. Id. at 302.
210. Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 970.
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was not new in Chambers, but had been acknowledged by the Su-
preme Court on several other occasions.211 Thus, according to the
court, it was "not concerned with a new or unique constitutional
right, but rather with the prescription of a new remedy to protect
an established right.12 12 The court recognized that while a new
trial provided adequate relief in Chambers, a retrial in Smith
would be meaningless unless Sanchez could be compelled to testify
under immunity. The court then cited a series of cases in which
both the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit had previously
found an inherent judicial power to grant witness immunity in or-
der to vindicate constitutional rights.2 13 To further support the
concept of judicial immunity the court quoted Herman, and its ref-
erence to Simmons v. United States, for the proposition that "'a
case in which clearly exculpatory testimony would be excluded be-
cause of a witness's assertion of the fifth amendment privilege
would present an even more compelling justification for such a
grant [of judicial immunity] than that accepted in Simmons
itself.' M214
Having thus concluded that it possessed the power, unaided
by statute, to order immunity for a defense witness, the court then
proceeded to outline the requisite conditions of a judicial grant of
immunity. The court modeled its conditions after those established
in Chambers"5 and found justification for their imposition in the
"unique and affirmative nature of the immunity remedy and fun-
damental considerations of separation of powers. '216 Accordingly,
the Smith court delineated the following requirements for judicial
211. Id. at 971. The court cited Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor's
suppression of exculpatory evidence known to him, but not known to defendant, violates
due process right to present an effective defense); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (due process requires that sixth amendment right to counsel be imposed on the
states); and Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (Government's informers privilege
must give way when disclosure of informer's identity, or contents of his communication, is
relevant and helpful to defense, or is essential to fair determination of case).
212. Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 971.
213. Id. The court cited the following cases: Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377
(1968) (testimony at fourth amendment suppression hearing); In re Grand Jury Investiga-
tion, 587 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1978) (testimony predicate to Speech and Debate Clause de-
fense); United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1978) (testimony predicate to double
jeopardy defense).
214. Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 971 (quoting United States v. Herman, 589
F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979)).
215. The court observed in a footnote that there were two central considerations in
the Chambers analysis: The clearly exculpatory nature of the excluded evidence and the
state's lack of interest in rigid enforcement of its evidence rules. Id. at 972 n.10.
216. Id. at 971.
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immunity: (1) The immunity must be properly sought in the dis-
trict court; (2) the defense witness must be available to testify; (3)
the proposed testimony must be clearly exculpatory; (4) the testi-
mony must be essential to defendant's case; and (5) there must be
no strong countervailing governmental interests. 217 The court ob-
served that its standard took into account objections to judicial
immunity recently raised in other circuit court opinions.218 Fur-
thermore, the court found that, in light of the stringent standard it
imposed in Smith, earlier cases in its own circuit did not preclude
this form of judicial immunity.219
After discussing the defendant's burden, the court carefully
considered the possible countervailing state interests. The court
acknowledged that unlike the mere evidentiary ruling in Cham-
bers, an affirmative grant of relief in the form of immunity was
"traditionally an exercise of the executive's power," and thus it
was even more important that the court "recognize, and be solici-
tous towards, legitimate state interests. 2 2 0 While recognizing that
judicial immunity most directly affects the government's decision
to prosecute and its manner of prosecution, the court believed it
217. Id. at 972.
218. The court noted that in United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1979),
the Fourth Circuit refused to grant immunity to a defense witness because the witness had
not appeared in court, the defendant had not shown that the witness would be able to claim
the fifth amendment privilege, and the defendant had not revealed either the content of the
proposed testimony or its exculpatory nature. Moreover, the court observed that in United
States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979), the Second
Circuit rejected a claim of defense witness immunity because the defendant failed to
demonstrate that the witness would not testify without immunity or that the failure to
grant immunity prejudiced his case. The Third Circuit concluded that these cases were not
inconsistent with the result reached in Smith because of the conditions that it had imposed
before judicial immunity could be granted. Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 972 n.13.
219. United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973), held that a court had no
blanket power to grant immunity to "any defense witnesses who might refuse to give testi-
mony on grounds of self-incrimination." Id. at 190 (emphasis added). Since under the Smith
standard immunity is denied if the proposed testimony is ambiguous, not clearly exculpa-
tory, or cumulative, or if it relates only to the credibility of the government's witnesses, the
court found that Smith and Berrigan were not inconsistent. The court then cited United
States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979), and United
States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978), and found
that these cases did not relate to the Smith holding since neither case discussed the subject
of judicially fashioned immunity for essential defense witnesses. Furthermore, to the extent
that these opinions discussed statutory immunity, neither case concerned prosecutorial mis-
conduct or deliberate distortion of the trial process by the government. Thus, according to
the court, the cases were of limited precedential value for immunity issues and did not
detract from the court's statutory immunity or judicial immunity analysis in Smith. Virgin
Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 972 n.11.
220. Id. at 973.
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possible to reconcile the government's interests as prosecutor with
the defendant's constitutional right to present an effective defense.
The court found that use immunity is often virtually costless to
the government, and it listed three situations in which any govern-
ment interest in withholding immunity would be "purely formal,
possibly suspect and should not, without close scrutiny, impede a
judicial grant of immunity. '2 21 When, however, the government re-
buts the defendant's showing of need, demonstrates that a grant ofimmunity to a defense witness would detrimentally affect the pub-
lic interest, or establishes that a grant would impose significant so-
cietal costs, the court acknowledged that an immunity application
would be properly denied. The Smith court cautioned the dis-
trict courts that when they review immunity applications, whether
they grant or deny the requests, they "should be careful to explain
the basis of [their] ruling. '2 3
On March 12, 1980, District Judge Troutman of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania conducted the first known pretrial eviden-
tiary hearing pursuant to Virgin Islands v. Smith. The hearing oc-
curred in the case of United States v. Shober224 in which the
defense filed motions to grant either statutory or judicial immunity
to former Congressman Daniel Flood and Edward Dixon, brother
of one of the defendants. The court rejected the Government's ini-
tial argument 22 5 that a hearing and ruling on a Smith motion
221. Id. The court listed the following three situations in which the government's in-
terest would not outweigh the defendant's due process rights: (1) The government may have
already assembled all the evidence necessary to prosecute the witness independent of the
witness' testimony; (2) the government may be able to separate the immunized witness'
testimony and so isolate it from any future testimony of the witness that it would not in-
vade the witness' constitutional rights if he were subsequently prosecuted; and (3) the gov-
ernment may seek a postponement of the defendant's trial so that it may complete its inves-
tigation of the defense witness who is the subject of an immunity application. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. In United States v. Lowell, 490 F. Supp. 897 (D.N.J. 1980), a case decided
only three months after Smith, the New Jersey federal district court adhered to the Smith
guidelines for statutory immunity and judicially conferred immunity. Although it found
both forms of immunity inapplicable under the facts of that case, the court followed the
Third Circuit's instructions and carefully outlined the reasons for its decision.
224. 489 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
225. In a memorandum, one of the assistant United States attorneys representing the
Government in Shober noted,
The [c]ourt's position on the timing of the hearing was affected at least in part by the
fact that everyone had already been assembled in Reading [Pennsylvania] to have a
hearing and by the fact that the jury will probably be sequestered and the [c]ourt
wants to avoid as many midtrial delays as possible.
Memorandum from Frank H. Sherman to All Criminal and Special Prosecution Division
Attorneys (March 14, 1980) (copy on file at the Vanderbilt Law Review) [hereinafter cited
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should be deferred until the conclusion of the Government's case
at trial.226 The Government contended that only after its proof had
been presented could it be determined with any degree of certainty
that (1) the defense still intends to call the witness; (2) the witness
is available; (3) he will assert his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion; (4) his testimony will be clearly exculpatory; and (5) his testi-
mony is essential to the defendant's case.227 The court denied with
prejudice the defense motion for statutory immunity because it
failed to find prosecutorial misconduct designed to distort the judi-
cial factfinding process in the Government's refusal to voluntarily
immunize the prospective witnesses. 2 8 In support of its motion for
judicial immunity, the defense offered testimony of counsel for one
witness and a letter from counsel for another witness that the wit-
nesses had certain described testimony to offer that would alleg-
edly exculpate the defendants.229 Without ruling on the sufficiency
of the substance of the proffered exculpatory testimony, Judge
Troutman denied the motion without prejudice2 30 and held that
third-party evidence is not sufficient to carry the movant's bur-
den23 ' and that "either direct testimony or a signed statement
from the prospective witness must be offered to make the neces-
sary showing. '23 2
Immediately following the announcement of the court's ruling,
counsel for defendants requested another hearing, which was set
for March 18, 1980.233 In the bench opinion issued at the close of
as Memorandum].
226. United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. at 414.
227. These are among the standards that the Third Circuit had outlined in Smith. See
text accompanying note 217 supra.
228. 489 F. Supp. at 415.
229. Id. at 414.
230. Id. at 415. The court denied the motion without prejudice because it recognized
the defense's opportunity "to make a proper showing as late as the conclusion of the Gov-
ernment's case at trial, as contended by the Government." Id.
231. Id.
232. Memorandum, supra note 225. At a later hearing, the court appeared to retreat
somewhat from its position concerning a signed statement. The court noted that at the
March 12 hearing, it erroneously stated that Smith dealt with the signed statement of the
witness, but, in fact, it concerned his statement to the police that might have been unsigned.
United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. at 416-17. The court, however, observed that the
witness' statement was important because it was "his statement, as opposed to counsel's
interpretation of such statement, inhibited and circumscribed by counsel's obligation to his
client and the existence of the attorney-client privilege." Id. at 417 (emphasis added). More-
over, in contrast to the attorneys' statements at the March 12 hearing, the witness' state-
ment in Smith was "clearly, if not admittedly, exculpatory." Id.
233. At the March 18 hearing, the court noted that defendant's burden in the context
of requests for immunity need not be met by any prescribed standards, "such as beyond a
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that hearing, Judge Troutman acknowleded that the Government's
argument that the Smith standards cannot be met until the close
of the Government's case at trial was "not without merit" since the
availability of the defense witness "can only be literally deter-
mined when he, in fact and in body, appears at trial. 2 4 Similarly,
whether the witness' testimony is clearly exculpatory and essential
to defendant's case or merely cumulative can only be ascertained
after the Government has, in fact, proven what it charged in the
indictment.2 5 Although it found the Government's arguments per-
suasive, the court noted that its "proper concern has broader
dimensions," including the defendant's due process rights.26 Thus,
the court concluded that immunity should be available when the
defendant can still "marshal his resources to make the right actu-
ally, not just theoretically, a useful one. '237 Accordingly, the court
found that when a defendant can make a "convincing showing"
before trial that the proposed witness' testimony complies with the
Smith standards, the court need not wait until the end of the Gov-
ernment's case to immunize the witness. 238 Since the court's find-
ing conflicted with its March 12 decision to deny with prejudice
defendant's motion for statutory immunity, it amended the March
12 order and denied defendant's motions without prejudice.2 39 In
support of its ruling, the court stated that avoidance of a mechani-
cal rule which required that the immunity decision be made either
before or during trial "allows sufficient flexibility to accommodate
the myriad complex of situations which may arise in the future
and to balance the competing needs and interests of the witness,
reasonable doubt, by a preponderance of the evidence, or even by establishing that what
they seek is more likely so than not so." Id. at 416. Rather, Smith referred alternatively to a
"prima facie showing" or a "convincing showing" sufficient to satisfy the court that the
proffered testimony would be both clearly exculpatory and essential to the defendant's case.
Id. Furthermore, the court noted that the Third Circuit failed to give any guidance concern-
ing what would be sufficient to constitute such a showing. Id.
234. Id. at 417.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. The court further observed,
To hold as a matter of law that the accused never has a right to conferral of immu-
nity upon a witness until the close of the Government's case may reduce Due Process
to an ethereal and theoretical principle with only rhetorical vitality. Access to an im-
munized witness prior to trial allows the accused an opportunity for sober reflection
and careful preparation, which may be unavailable if the right is animated in mid-trial.
Id.
238. Id. at 417-18.
239. Id.
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the Government and the accused. 240
B. The Restrictive Approach
In contrast to the expansive view advocated by the Third Cir-
cuit, several courts have adopted a narrower approach and have
rejected the concept of judicial immunity for defense witnesses.
These courts rely on a separation of powers analysis and emphasize
that a court has no authority to grant immunity since that power
rests solely with the executive branch of government. For example,
in United States v. McMichael2"4 the court accepted the first
prong of Smith, which allows a court to order dismissal unless the
prosecution grants statutory immunity, but it rejected the second
prong of Smith, which authorizes grants of judicial immunity. The
court criticized the Third Circuit for seeking support for judicial
immunity in cases "not directly in point. '24 2 The court found that
the great weight of authority does not recognize judicial immunity
and suggested that "the Third Circuit's opinion doesn't face up to
the mischief which can result from an exercise of this heretofore
unknown power of a judge. '24 3 In addition, the court stated that
while use immunity may appear virtually costless to the govern-
ment, it should not be left to the trial judge, who generally lacks a
complete knowledge of the case, to determine the price the govern-
ment must pay for the immunity grant.244 The court also criticized
judicial immunity because, in its view, trial judges cannot remain
impartial if they become involved in the type of inquiry necessary
to determine whether immunity should be granted.24 5 In conclu-
sion, the court observed that if a federal district judge can grant
immunity, "so can a Bankruptcy Judge or an Administrative Law
Judge or a ... non-lawyer county or municipal judge or an Indian
Tribal Judge. '24 6
240. Id. For example, the court noted that "circumstances may justify conferral of
judicial immunity to one prospective witness prior to trial and deferring final decision con-
cerning another witness until the close of the Government's case." Id. The court then denied
the defense motions for judicial immunity, again without prejudice. Id. at 419.
241. 492 F. Supp. 205 (D. Colo. 1980).
242. Id. at 208. See note 211 supra and accompanying text.
243. United States v. McMichael, 492 F. Supp. at 210.
244. Id. at 211. According to the court, "[F]acts which the prosecution does not want
to disclose and which it should not be required to disclose may inflate the cost to monumen-
tal proportions if all facts were disclosed." Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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Similarly, in United States v. Davis2 47 the First Circuit held
that the trial court does not have the authority either to grant im-
munity to a witness whose testimony the defendant may wish to
offer or to force the prosecution to grant the witness immunity.
The court failed to address the question whether, as in Morrison, a
court could order dismissal if the prosecution refused to grant im-
munity because the defense made no allegation of prosecutorial
misconduct.248 Furthermore, the court did not consider the prob-
lem raised hypothetically in the Earl footnote, since the prosecu-
tion had not immunized any government witnesses. 49 Instead, the
court's relatively brief discussion of the immunity issue focused on
a separation of powers analysis. According to the First Circuit, the
court's role in the immunity context remains largely ministerial:
"The court may scrutinize the record to ascertain that a request
for immunity is, under the statute, jurisdictionally and procedur-
ally well-founded and accompanied by the approval of the Attor-
ney General. '250
United States v. Turkish,251 perhaps the most prominent cir-
cuit court decision to consider defense witness immunity, included
an extensive critique of the Third Circuit's opinion in Smith.
Turkish concerned a defendant convicted of evading income taxes,
filing false income tax returns, and conspiring to defraud the
United States.2 5 On appeal, defendant claimed that the prosecu-
tion and trial judge improperly denied his motion, made at the
conclusion of the Government's case at trial, to immunize seven-
teen prospective defense witnesses.253 While it found no support
247. 623 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1980).
248. Id. at 193.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 192-93 (quoting In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 479 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 829 (1977)).
251. 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).
252. Id. at 770.
253. Id. at 771. Although the Government considered the motion, it decided not to
grant immunity. Judge Broderick reserved decision on the motion until after the trial. At
the trial's conclusion, he denied the defendant's motion for a new trial or acquittal. In a
subsequent unreported opinion, he set forth his analysis of the issues and his reasons for
denying the motion. According to Judge Broderick, the sixth amendment compulsory pro-
cess clause does not afford defendants the right to require witness immunity, but such a
right is "probably" contained in the fifth amendment due process clause. The judge, how-
ever, denied defendant benefit of this "probable" fifth amendment right to defense witness
immunity for two reasons. First, he found the motion untimely, since it should have been
made at the beginning of the trial. Second, he concluded that defense witness immunity
should be available only for material and exculpatory testimony and that the defendants in
the instant case had not shown that the proffered testimony would be either material or
[Vol. 34:16651702
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for a claim of defense witness immunity in the sixth amendment,
the Second Circuit conceded that the concept has a "more plausi-
ble basis" in the fifth amendment due process requirement of basic
fairness. 254
The court discussed two arguments that defendants have ad-
vanced in support of a fifth amendment claim. The court found the
first argument, based on equalizing the powers of the prosecution
and the defense, thoroughly unpersuasive.255 Although it found the
second argument, based on the need to pursue the truth, somewhat
more attractive, the court rejected this argument because of the
various public interests affected by a claim for defense witness im-
munity.2 5 Seeking to determine whether the balancing of these
public interests with the defendant's interest in obtaining truthful
exculpatory testimony through defense witness immunity is a
proper judicial function, the court acknowledged the Third Cir-
cuit's conclusion in Smith that a court may grant immunity with-
out invading the realm of either the legislative or the executive
exculpatory. Id. at 771-72.
254. Id. at 773-74. The court observed in a footnote that defense witness immunity
cannot qualify as a due process right on the theory that it is part of the "compelling tradi-
tions of the legal profession," Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952), since the con-
cept only developed in the 1960s and has only been regarded as plausible since the passage
of the use immunity statute. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d at 774 n.2.
255. The court noted that the administration of the criminal law system involves a
procedural imbalance in favor of the defendant. The prosecution must prove defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the entire jury. Furthermore, it may
not obtain defendant's testimony, suppress exculpatory evidence, or re-try defendant after
acquittal, despite the occurrence of errors prejudicial to the Government. The defendant, on
the other hand, may prevail without offering any proof whatsoever, need not disclose any
inculpatory evidence he discovers, may avoid conviction by persuading one juror that rea-
sonable doubt exists, and may challenge a conviction by direct appeal and subsequent col-
lateral attack. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d at 774. The system also provides the Gov-
ernment with law enforcement powers unavailable to the defense. The court noted that
unlike the defense, the Government may arrest suspects, search private premises, wiretap
telephones, and take advantage of the investigative resources of large public agencies. Id.
The court concluded that while equal availability of use immunity for prosecution and de-
fense witnesses may be appealing on the surface, "[flew would seriously argue" that grant-
ing defendants all the Government's powers or equalizing the procedural burdens of prose-
cution and defense at trial would serve the public interest. Id.
256. Id. at 775. First, the court noted that while the Government remains free under
Kastigar to prosecute an immunized witness, it must prove that it did not obtain its evi-
dence against the witness as a result of his immunized testimony. Second, the obstacles to a
successful prosecution of an immunized witness may force the Government to curtail its
cross-examination of the witness in the case on trial in order to narrow the scope of the
testimony that the witness can later claim tainted his subsequent prosecution. Last, the
court noted that defense witness immunity could invite cooperative perjury among defen-
dants and their associates. In the court's opinion, the threat of a perjury conviction, with
penalties frequently far below substantive offenses, would not prevent such tactics. Id.
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branch. The court examined the two-part inquiry required by
Smith-whether the prosecution opposed immunity because of a
deliberate intention to distort the judicial factfinding process,25
and whether strong countervailing state interests outweighed de-
fendant's need for clearly exculpatory evidence 25 5-- and found that
both inquiries force the trial court to overstep the bounds of its
authority. First, the court observed that an inquiry into the prose-
cutor's intent will often lead to exploration and premature disclo-
sure of the pending status of an investigation against the wit-
ness.259 Second, the court found that in most cases an examination
of the countervailing interests will reveal that some legitimate
state interests do indeed exist and further, that constitutional fair-
ness is not a satisfactory standard by which to analyze such
interests.260
The Turkish court narrowly construed Smith and confined the
Third Circuit's analysis to the specific facts of that case. The court
emphasized that Smith did not require balancing the public inter-
est in withholding immunity against the defense need for it, since
the Virgin Islands prosecutor had agreed to grant immunity.6 ' In-
stead, the court characterized Smith as simply a case of a prosecu-
tor who, without jurisdiction over the witness and for no apparent
reason, interfered and suppressed evidence that would otherwise
have become available to the defense. Indeed, the Second Circuit
had "no dispute with the holding in Smith," although it disagreed
with the standards announced in that decision. 62 After its lengthy
analysis of the issue, the court determined that the fifth amend-
ment due process clause does not require defense witness immu-
nity "whenever it seems fair to grant it."'26 On the contrary, while
the essential fairness required by the fifth amendment "guards the
defendant against overreaching by the prosecutor . ..and insu-
lates him against the prejudice," it does not oblige either prosecu-
257. See text accompanying notes 203-04 supra.
258. See text accompanying notes 217 & 220-22 supra.
259. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d at 777. The court further observed that a
prosecutor without enough evidence to indict a witness may legitimately prefer to maintain
his option to prosecute once he obtains additional information. The court argued that the
mere absence of a present intention to prosecute cannot fairly be characterized as evidence
of an intention to distort the factfinding process. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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tors or courts to secure privileged evidence for the defense.2 ' The
court then stated its reason for examining the issue at such length:
"[W]e [do not] wish to see criminal trials regularly interrupted by
wide-ranging inquiries concerning the specific pros and cons of de-
fense witness immunity in a particular case."
26 5
The Turkish court concluded its opinion by outlining the
proper procedure to be followed by a court faced with a claim for
defense witness immunity. According to the court, trial judges
should summarily reject claims for defense witness immunity
whenever the witness is "an actual or potential target of prosecu-
tion.'"26  Furthermore, a hearing need not be held to establish the
witness' status.8 7 Under the court's suggested procedure, the pros-
ecutor need only show that the witness has been indicted or "pre-
sent to the court in camera an ex parte affidavit setting forth the
circumstances that support the prosecutor's suspicion of the wit-
ness's criminal activity."26 8
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR DEFENSE
WITNESS IMMUNITY
In light of the conflicting state of the case law, further consid-
eration of the constitutional bases for defense witness immunity is
warranted. Such an examination is particularly advisable since the
Supreme Court has declined to grant certiorari in any case dealing
with the question of immunity for defense witnesses.2 9 Until the
Court resolves the issue, criminal defendants will continue to re-
quest immunity for their witnesses. This Note next reviews various
constitutional arguments that can be advanced by the defense at-
torney in support of an application for defense witness immunity.
Before the defendant resorts to arguments based on constitutional
considerations, however, he should carefully review the state's rea-
sons for refusing to immunize the defense witness. If the defendant
can demonstrate that the prosecutor opposed the immunity grant
"with the deliberate intention of distorting the judicial factfinding
264. Id.
265. Id. at 778.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. The court noted that the prosecutor is under no duty to prosecute the wit-
ness. Rather, he simply has an option to rely on the witness' status as an actual or potential
target of prosecution in order to prevent any inquiry concerning immunity for that witness.
Id.
269. See notes 39 & 157 supra and accompanying text.
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process,2 70 recourse to the constitutional arguments discussed be-
low may be unnecessary.
A. The Separation of Powers Analysis
The Constitution separates the powers of the federal govern-
ment into three distinct areas: The legislature makes the laws,2 1
the executive executes the laws,272 and the judiciary hears and de-
cides cases.273 When examining the extent of prosecutorial discre-
tion, courts have traditionally applied a strict interpretation of the
separation of powers doctrine. Accordingly, they have acknowl-
edged that the prosecution enjoys broad discretion when deciding
whether to charge a defendant,21 4 nolle prosequi a case,275 or plea
bargain.2 76 Thus, most courts have concluded that, absent bad
faith, the Constitution proscribes judicial review of these discre-
tionary prosecutorial decisions.277 Courts that adopt this restrictive
270. Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 969 (3d Cir. 1980).
271. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
272. Id. art. II, § 1.
273. Id. art. III,§ 2.
274. See United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 413-15 (1920) (prosecution need
not ask leave of court to introduce before grand jury criminal counts that prior grand jury
had rejected); Inmates of Attica v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1973) (judicial
review of prosecutor's decision not to prosecute is unwise and beyond court's capacity);
Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (mandamus will not
lie to control exercise of Attorney General's discretion to prosecute bank conspiracy), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966); Moses v. Katzenbach, 342 F.2d 931, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per
curiam) (court may not compel prosecution to bring action against civil rights violators be-
cause that decision is committed to executive branch); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167,
171-72 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (court may not order United States attorney to prepare and sign
indictment), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); District of Columbia v. Buckley, 128 F.2d 17,
20 (D.C. Cir.) (decision to prosecute for more than one offense arising from same transaction
is policy matter for the prosecution), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 658 (1942); Pugach v. Klein, 193
F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (federal courts are powerless to interfere with prosecu-
tor's decision not to initiate action against state officials).
275. See The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1868) (discretionary
power of prosecution includes absolute power to enter nolle prosequi before jury is empanel-
led); United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975) (prosecution is best judge of
whether a pending case should be terminated), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); United
States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100, 102-03 (S.D. Ill. 1945) (prosecutor's power to enter nolle
prosequi may not be reviewed by court unless abuse of discretion shown).
276. See Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (United
States attorney possesses discretion to accept plea bargain from one codefendant and not
the other and judiciary is ill suited to review such decision).
277. Inmates of Attica v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1973). In United
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965), the Fifth
Circuit held,
Although as a member of the bar, the attorney for the United States is an officer of the
court, he is nevertheless an executive official of the Government and it is as an officer
1706
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approach have tended to minimize the importance of other consti-
tutional guarantees, particularly those found in the fifth and sixth
amendments. For example, in Earl v. United States the District of
Columbia Circuit relied on a literal interpretation of the separation
of powers doctrine and refused to require a federal prosecutor to
grant immunity to a defense witness despite the defendant's claim
that refusal to do so violated his fifth amendment due process
rights.2 78 Earl demonstrates that an extension of the restrictive
view of the separation of powers doctrine to the question of de-
fense witness immunity may prevent the defendant from obtaining
valuable testimony of reluctant witnesses and thus deny him the
opportunity to present a meaningful defense. This result directly
conflicts with Supreme Court decisions that support the defen-
dant's right to call witnesses on his behalf.279
In contrast to the Earl court and other courts that have fol-
lowed its restrictive approach, the Framers of the Constitution had
a much less exacting view of the separation of powers doctrine.
The doctrine was not intended to keep the branches totally iso-
lated from one another. On the contrary, in order to maintain a
proper balance of powers, the various branches must interact while
remaining separate. 80 Perhaps the most famous statement of the
of the executive department that he exercises a discretion as to whether or not there
shall be a prosecution in a particular case. It follows, as an incident of the constitu-
tional separation of powers, that the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of
the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over
criminal prosecutions.
Id. at 171. Commentators have also suggested that the separation of powers doctrine re-
quires each branch to act completely independent of the other two. See, e.g., Bestor, Sepa-
ration of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Original Intent of the Constitution
Historically Examined, 5 SErON HAL L. REV. 527, 535 (1974) (many present-day commen-
tators view mandatory collaboration among the branches as the "very antithesis" of the idea
of separation of powers); Cox, Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
383, 394-95 (1976) (majority view is that separation of powers doctrine prevents judicial
review of prosecutorial discretion).
278. See text accompanying notes 158-61 supra.
279. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (right to call witness
on one's own behalf long recognized as essential to due process); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972) (due process requires that parolee have opportunity to present wit-
nesses and documentary evidence at parole revocation hearing); Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (right to compel attendance of witnesses and to offer their testimony is
fundamental element of due process).
280. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-22 (1975) (per curiam) (Constitution recog-
nizes that sealing off the three branches of government ;vould preclude establishment of
effective national government; total separation of the three branches not contempated by
Framers). Several commentators have also noted that in order to be workable the Constitu-
tion requires overlapping powers. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.09 (1958)
(within framework of the Constitution the idea that judicial, legislative, and executive power
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flexible view of the separation of powers doctrine is found in Jus-
tice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer:2 8'
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot
conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on
isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context. While the Constitu-
tion diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It
enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity. 82
Courts have been increasingly willing to apply a flexible view of the
separation of powers doctrine in areas other than prosecutorial dis-
cretion in criminal cases. For example, courts have narrowly de-
fined "political question" and thus have expanded the range of is-
sues subject to judicial review. s3 Moreover, in administrative law,
courts have reviewed discretionary decisions of both cabinet heads
and regulatory agencies.284 Because the judicial branch has been
willing to intervene in matters relegated to a co-equal branch when
should not be blended is unworkable); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE Ac-
TION 28-30 (abr. ed. 1965) (separation of powers is "the expression of a general attitude
rather than inexorable table of organization"; complete exclusiveness between powers is im-
possible); Cox, supra note 277, at 397 (emerging minority view is that separation of powers
gives only limited discretion to the prosecutor and does not bar judicial review; court and
prosecution have overlapping responsibilities; judicial review of discretionary powers more
consistent with original intent of separation of powers doctrine).
281. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
282. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
283. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-59 (1969) (decision by House of Rep-
resentatives to exclude a member not a political question); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962) (constitutionality of state statute apportioning legislative districts not a political
question); State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1106-07 (8th Cir. 1973) (Secre-
tary of Transportation's decision to withhold previously apportioned highway funds not a
political question). The court in each of these cases found the issue justiciable despite the
political overtones of the problems.
284. See Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 673-76 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (SEC's decision not to demand the inclusion in corporation's proxy statement of a
resolution requiring the company to discontinue production of napalm held reviewable; lim-
ited ieview of agency determination necessary to ensure that it is within statute granting
power to the agency), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 503 (1972); Environmental Defense Fund v.
Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (discretionary decision of Secretary of Agricul-
ture to take no action on request for suspension of registration of products containing DDT
reviewable; clear showing of legislative intent necessary to preclude judicial review); Safir v.
Gibson, 417 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir. 1969) (Federal Maritime Commission's decision not to
seek recovery of subsidies paid to shipping conference that had engaged in anticompetitive
tactics reviewable; court may review to determine whether agency has properly exercised its
discretion under applicable statute), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); DeVito v. Schultz,
300 F. Supp. 381, 383 (D.D.C. 1969) (mem.) (Secretary of Labor's decision not to initiate
proceedings to set aside results of contested election reviewable; courts have duty to ensure
that wishes of Congress not frustrated).
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necessary to prevent abuses of authority or violations of constitu-
tional rights, the courts should show a similar willingness to act
when faced with appropriate claims for defense witness immunity.
The Supreme Court decision in United States v. Nixon 85 in-
dicates that at least in regard to judicial refusal to review acts of
prosecutorial discretion, the strict interpretation of the separation
of powers doctrine may be losing its vitality. In Nixon, perhaps the
most prominent separation of powers case, the Supreme Court
unanimously2 8 6 rejected President Nixon's claim of an absolute ex-
ecutive privilege and his motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum
for tape recordings sought for use in a criminal trial. 87 While the
Court recognized that the separation of powers doctrine ensures
the efficient functioning of government, it noted that "neither the
doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of
high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute,
unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial pro-
cess under all circumstances. 2 88 The Court took an unrestrictive
view of the separation of powers doctrine and observed that "[iln
designing the structure of our Government and dividing and allo-
cating the sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the
Framers of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive
system, but the separate powers were not intended to operate with
absolute independence."'28 9 United States v. Nixon not only
presents strong evidence that the Court may have begun to accept
a less rigorous view of the separation of powers doctrine,290 but also
implicitly weakens the continuing validity of Earl. Under Nixon's
flexible separation of powers analysis, once a defendant shows a
legitimate need for testimony from an unwilling witness, the court
must balance his need against the state's interest in withholding
immunity from the particular witness. Since Nixon, courts have
gradually begun to adopt a flexible approach to separation of pow-
ers and have manifested an increased willingness to review acts of
prosecutorial discretion.291
285. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
286. Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the opinion.
287. 418 U.S. at 687-88, 706.
288. Id. at 706.
289. Id. at 707.
290. In Nixon the Court further stated, "The impediment that an absolute, unquali-
fied privilege would place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial
Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of the
courts under Art. III." Id.
291. See United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 512-13 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
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Although the flexible separation of powers analysis employed
in Nixon, in contrast with the restrictive view, supports the de-
fense attorney's application for defense witness immunity, it fails
to provide a satisfactory vehicle with which to balance the compet-
ing interests. Instead, the balancing test suggested in Nixon se-
verely limits the right to defense witness immunity. For example,
although it may benefit some defendants, the Nixon balancing test
may not result in immunity when the defense witness is charged
with a particularly serious offense because the court could reasona-
bly conclude that the state's specific interest in a successful prose-
cution of the witness outweighs the defendant's interest in poten-
tially exculpatory testimony. Such a result, while authorized by the
Nixon analysis, nonetheless seems inequitable. The seriousness of
the charge against a defense witness should not be the determining
factor in the decision whether to grant immunity and uphold the
defendant's right to present potentially exculpatory evidence. Be-
cause the flexible separation of powers approach may not protect
defendants who seek immunity for a witness charged with a serious
crime, the defense attorney may be forced to resort to other consti-
tutional arguments in support of an application for defense witness
immunity.
B. The Due Process Analysis
A second constitutional argument the defense attorney should
assert in support of an application for defense witness immunity is
the defendant's fifth amendment right to due process of law.292 A
procedural due process inquiry does not involve a systematic anal-
ysis, but rather consists of the application of general principles of
fundamental fairness or "ordered liberty' 298 to the particular facts
of each case. In the context of immunity grants for defense wit-
nesses, the substance of the due process challenge argues that the
court's failure to review prosecutorial decisions denying defense
witness immunity deprives the defendant of a fair trial because the
failure to provide immunity prevents him from presenting a com-
425 U.S. 971 (1976) (court may review prosecutor's decision to dismiss charges); Nader v.
Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679-80, 679 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (dictum) (court may review decision
not to prosecute in order to determine whether prosecution exceeded constitutional or statu-
tory limits of discretion).
292. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in relevant part, "No person shall ...be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
293. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937).
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plete defense and permits a determination of guilt based on incom-
plete evidence. Naturally, a defendant's need to immunize his wit-
nesses as an element of due process cannot be examined in a
vacuum. The court must assess the various interests at stake in an
attempt to discover the relevance of each to the defendant's right
to a fair trial. If the requested immunity will sufficiently protect
the relevant countervailing interests and privileges, then the de-
fense motion for immunity must prevail.
1. The Defendant's Interest
While the Constitution does not guarantee the defendant an
error-free trial, it does guarantee him a fair one. A defendant's
need for witness immunity often arises because his associates are
the only knowledgeable witnesses, and concomitantly the witnesses
most likely to assert the fifth amendment privilege. 294 Immunity
statutes, in fact, originated because prosecutors often must resort
to coparticipants for testimony.9 5 In other factual situations as
well, the defendant stands to lose potentially exculpatory testi-
mony if a witness pleads the fifth amendment but does not receive
immunity.29 6 In each situation, since the jury may never hear high-
ly material testimony on the issue of guilt or innocence, the defen-
dant's due process rights may be violated. By refusing to grant im-
munity to an exculpatory defense witness, the prosecutor
effectively eliminates the witness and greatly affects the fairness of
the trial. Failure to immunize a prosecution witness, however, will
not render the trial unfair to the defendant, although it may affect
the trial's result since the state must always prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In a line of cases ending with Brady v. Maryland,97 the Su-
preme Court repeatedly emphasized the importance of the defen-
294. In Kastigar the Court observed that "many offenses are of such a character that
the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crime." Kas-
tigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972).
295. Id. at 446-47, 447 n.15.
296. Examples of such situations include cases in which the witness whom the defen-
dant intends to call is actually guilty of the crime with which the defendant is charged; the
witness would testify that a third person committed the crime, but fears incrimination by
some act related to his presence at the scene of the crime; the witness fears that when he
corroborates the defendant's alibi he will implicate himself in another crime; the witness is
awaiting sentencing on a charge unrelated to the defendant's case and fears arousing the
resentment of the prosecutor if he fails to cooperate; or the witness could testify on behalf
of the defendant's affirmative defense, but fears prosecution on charges unrelated to the
defendant's charge.
297. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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dant's right to due process. In Brady the Court reversed the defen-
dant's conviction because the prosecutor withheld material
evidence relevant to the defense.9 8 While earlier cases emphasized
the presence of prosecutorial misconduct,2 9 Brady held that the
failure to disclose favorable material information, regardless of the
prosecutor's good faith, violated due process.300 In the suppression
cases, the Supreme Court upheld the defendant's need for access
to information over the prosecution's impermissible desire to con-
ceal evidence and thus prevent the defendant's acquittal. Simi-
larly, in other areas courts have concluded that the defendant's
need for access exceeds governmental interests. For example, in
Roviaro v. United Statess0 1 the Supreme Court held that the state
interest in concealing the identity of informants in order to en-
courage citizens to cooperate with the police must yield to the de-
fendant's due process right "where the disclosure of an informer's
identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and
helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair deter-
mination of a cause. 30 2 The Roviaro Court balanced the public's
interest in protecting the flow of information necessary to effective
law enforcement against the defendant's right to prepare his de-
fense3 03 and concluded that if the privileged information was im-
portant to the defense, the trial court could require the prosecu-
tion to choose between disclosure or dismissal.30'
Brady and Roviaro indicate that courts now accord great
298. Defendant, along with a codefendant, was charged with first degree murder. De-
fense counsel asked to examine the codefendant's out-of-court statements. The prosecutor
made certain of these statements available, but not the one in which the codefendant admit-
ted that he committed the homicide. The defense did not learn of the existence of this
statement until after defendant's conviction. Id. at 84.
299. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (the state may not knowingly use
false testimony even when the testimony goes only to the witness' credibility); Alcorta v.
Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (conviction overturned when the prosecutor failed to correct false
testimony of witness); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945) (conviction obtained through the
knowing use of false and perjured testimony not permitted to stand); Pyle v. Kansas, 317
U.S. 213 (1942) (defendant denied due process when conviction resulted from use of testi-
mony, known by prosecutor to be perjured, and from prosecutor's deliberate suppression of
evidence favorable to defendant); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (due process
requirement is not satisfied when a conviction is obtained by presentation of testimony
known to prosecutor to be perjured).
300. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87; accord, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
104-07 (1976).
301. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
302. Id. at 60-61.
303. Id. at 62.
304. Id. at 61.
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weight to the defendant's need for information. The holdings of
the suppression cases and the informer's privilege cases seem par-
ticularly applicable to the defense witness immunity problem. In
light of these cases holding that a defendant is denied a fair trial
when he does not know of exculpatory evidence that the prosecu-
tor possesses but does not reveal, it is incongruous to find that a
defendant is not denied a fair trial when he knows of evidence but
cannot present it because of the prosecutor's failure to cooperate.
In the absence of a strong countervailing interest, courts should
not allow the prosecutor to deny access to information, just as they
do not allow him to withhold the information itself. If the prosecu-
tor who withholds information violates due process, then so does
the prosecutor who, even though acting in good faith, denies the
defendant the opportunity to obtain and present information from
a third party. The prosecutor's affirmative duty to provide access
to information implies a duty to immunize defense witnesses whose
testimony is material to the defense.
This due process analysis recognizes that the state possesses
significant advantages over the defense in obtaining evidence and
presenting its case in court. Generally, the prosecution has greater
financial and human resources with which to investigate its case
and, unlike the defense, has access to police informants, search
warrants, and grand juries. The accused's ability to present an ef-
fective defense diminishes whenever the state gains a power to ob-
tain evidence, such as the power to immunize witnesses, that the
accused does not share. Thus, the defendant requires protection in
order to maintain some degree of equality between the investiga-
tory facilities of defense and prosecution.305
In Wardius v. Oregons08 the Supreme Court held that due pro-
cess mandates reciprocal discovery rights for defense and prosecu-
tion, even though reciprocal discovery may enable the defendant to
305. Judge William J. Bauer of the Seventh Circuit recently stated a contrary view on
the balance of forces between defense and prosecution. In his opinion,
There is an aspect of inequality in the criminal process. But it is the government who
generally suffers from the inequality. It is the government which must come forward
with the evidence.. . bear the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt . . . [and] overcome the defendant's presumption of innocence. The
criminal system was designed to protect those charged with crimes from unwarranted
charges. Thus, it is appropriate that the system favor the defendant. But the fact that
the defense lacks immunity power does not change a system of justice in which the
defendant always has the benefit of the doubt.
Bauer, Reflections on the Role of Statutory Immunity in the Criminal Justice System, 67
J. CanM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 143, 152 (1976).
306. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
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obtain evidence to which he had no independent constitutional
right. In Wardius the Court examined a state statute that required
a defendant to file a pretrial notice of his intention to present alibi
evidence and a list of his alibi witnesses.07 While the notice re-
quirement alone did not violate due process, the Court found that
because the statute did not require the Government to reveal its
rebuttal witnesses, it violated the defendant's fifth amendment
rights.30 ' Justice Marshall observed that "the State's inherent in-
formation-gathering advantages suggest that if there is to be any
imbalance in discovery rights, it should work in the defendant's
favor. 3 0 9 Thus, in the absence of a strong state interest to justify
the imbalance of discovery rights, the state must make discovery a
"two-way" street.10
The Wardius rationale arguably applies with equal force in
the context of defense witness immunity. Since the power to im-
munize witnesses constitutes such a valuable aid to the prosecu-
tion,3 11 the denial of defense witness immunity tips "the balance of
forces between the accused and the accuser"3 12 in favor of the
state. Unless the prosecution can present some strong state inter-
ests to the contrary, the doctrine of reciprocal discovery requires
that since the state can immunize important prosecution witnesses,
the defendant's interest in immunity for his witnesses should also
be recognized. This analysis highlights the flaw in the logic of
Judge Burger's famous footnote in Earl v. United States in which
he speculated that had the prosecution immunized one of its wit-
nesses, the defense might then have had a strong constitutional
claim to immunity for its witness.3 13 The defendant's need for tes-
timony from one witness may be totally unrelated to the state's
desire for testimony from another witness. Furthermore, the prose-
cution may not need immunity to compel testimony from any of
its witnesses. The right to defense witness immunity should not be
accorded only to those defendants fortunate enough to have state
witnesses immunized at their trials. Such an arrangement would
violate the fundamental fairness required by the fifth amendment
307. Id. at 475.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 475 n.9.
310. Id. at 475; accord, United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 314 (1973) (defendant has
right to counsel during lineup to "counter balance" prosecutorial advantage).
311. See text accompanying notes 153-56 supra.
312. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. at 474.
313. Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see text accompany-
ing note 166 supra.
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due process clause.
2. The Prosecutor's Interest
Traditionally, the government's major argument against de-
fense witness immunity has been its compelling interest in prose-
cuting the guilty coupled with its concern that "[a] person sus-
pected of crime should not be empowered to give his confederates
an immunity bath. 3 14 The burden that defense witness immunity
places on these interests depends to a large degree on the scope of
immunity. The government may have had a legitimate concern
with "immunity baths" under the former transactional immunity
statutes, which, according to Judge Burger in Earl, conferred "for-
mal and binding absolution. 3 15 The 1970 federal witness immunity
statute,s however, does not grant such sweeping immunity and
thus, enhances the criminal defendant's argument that denial of
immunity violates due process. The Supreme Court's holding in
Kastigar that use immunity is coextensive with the scope of the
fifth amendment privileges17 significantly deemphasized the weight
accorded the interests of the prosecutor. Since Kastigar, immunity
only denies the prosecutor the use or derivative use of the witness'
compelled testimony. Thus, the Government can prosecute the im-
munized witness after the trial based on independently derived ev-
idence. The Kastigar rationale applies equally well in connection
with defense witness immunity. The Court noted that a grant of
use immunity "leaves the witness and the prosecutorial authorities
in substantially the same position" s 8 as if the witness had not tes-
tified. The prosecutor remains in the same position because the
witness' statements, which the prosecutor cannot use against him,
are ones that he would not have made without immunity. Thus,
the limited scope of use immunity minimizes the potential inter-
ference of defense witness immunity with the prosecutor's
discretion.1 9
The state's second reason for seeking to retain control over
314. In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir. 1973).
315. Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
316. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. H, § 201(a), 84
Stat. 926 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976)); see text accompanying notes 132-56
supra.
317. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453-55 (1972); see text accompanying
note 148 supra.
318. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 462.
319. Naturally, this analysis does not apply to those states that continue to provide for
transactional immunity grants. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1324 (West Supp. 1978).
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witness immunity grants has been its concern that the defense
would abuse the power and employ immunity to stall for time and
thus increase the government's costs of prosecuting the defen-
dant. 20 Furthermore, the state argues that defense witnesses will
have a greater incentive than prosecution witnesses to commit per-
jury, particularly codefendants who could use immunity to swear
to each other's innocence.2 1 The perjury argument, however, rests
on very weak grounds. Why should an immunized defense witness
be more willing to risk a perjury prosecution than an immunized
government witness? As Chief Justice Warren once observed, "To
think that criminals will lie to save their fellows but not to obtain
favors from the prosecution for themselves is indeed to clothe the
criminal class with more nobility than one might expect to find in
the public at large. 3 2 2 An additional flaw in the state's argument
arises because even if defense witnesses tend to commit perjury to
a greater extent than prosecution witnesses, the Supreme Court
has held statutes designed to prevent perjury unconstitutional if
they discourage the defendant's exercise of his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination 2 3 or his sixth amendment right
to the material testimony of witnesses. 3 24
A third reason that the government has advanced against de-
fense witness immunity is its belief that the prosecutor will face
added time-expenditure and nuisance when he subsequently at-
tempts to prosecute an immunized defense witness based on inde-
pendently acquired evidence. Such inconvenience, however, is un-
likely to occur because in many instances the state will have
already prosecuted the witness for crimes about which he will tes-
tify, or he may have plea bargained with the prosecutor and
pleaded guilty to one count. In these situations, the government
probably has little or no interest in bringing further charges
320. Defendants would not always attempt to use immunity to stall for time. For ex-
ample, defendants who cannot afford bail have very little incentive to delay their trials.
321. One critic of immunity for defense witnesses observed that "[i]f the power to
grant immunity were given to defendants, what would prevent them from showering their
co-defendants with immunity grants in order to 'beat the rap'?" See Bauer, supra note 305,
at 152.
322. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967).
323. See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (statute that guards against perjury
with requirement that defendant who wishes to testify must do so before other defense
witnesses held unconstitutional under fourteenth amendment; operation of statute may con-
flict with defendant's right to remain silent and to benefit from advice of counsel).
324. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (statute designed to prevent perjury
by prohibiting participant accused of a crime from testifying for a coparticipant violates
defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process).
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against the witness. Furthermore, when the government has not
yet prosecuted the witness, it may already have amassed enough
evidence with which to do so. While the burden on the prosecutor
of later proving that his evidence was not tainted by the immu-
nized testimony may occasionally be heavy, it is not unrealistic and
it may be sufficiently minimized by proper precautionary measures
so that subsequent state prosecution will not be barred. For exam-
ple, the government can simply seal all its evidence against the
witness prior to the witness' testimony. The sealing of evidence is
particularly appropriate when the defendant calls a codefendant to
testify. An immunity grant to a codefendant costs the state noth-
ing since the prosecutor must prepare his case against all code-
fendants before trial and, thus, before the defendant requests im-
munity. Furthermore, subsequent prosecution of the witness by a
jurisdiction other than the one in which the witness received im-
munity will not be barred as long as that jurisdiction does not ac-
quire access to the compelled testimony. 25 Thus, the only burden
will be the exercise of increased discretion during an exchange of
information between the prosecutors s.32  Although the possibility
always exists that precautionary procedures could break down,
presumably prosecutors would be especially careful when dealing
with immunized defense witnesses to protect the confidentiality of
their testimony. As a further possibility, the court could grant the
prosecution a continuance to collect additional evidence before the
witness testifies. Since the trial would be unfair without the wit-
ness' testimony, and since the defendant would have the choice of
delaying his trial or not presenting the witness' testimony, the con-
tinuance would not inhibit the defendant's right to a speedy
325. See Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 568 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(danger of taint, while "substantial when a single jurisdiction both compels incriminating
testimony and brings a later prosecution, may fade when the jurisdiction bringing the prose-
cution differs from the jurisdiction that compelled the testimony").
326. One author suggested special procedures for handling such a situation, including
insuring strict control of secret grand jury transcripts of compelled testimony; segregat-
ing all compelled testimony transcripts and limiting access to them to a need-to-know
basis; assuring that all who read such transcripts have prior notice of their nature and
the taint problem; . . . requesting, when appropriate, limitations on the disclosure of
compelled testimony given at trial . . . [and] developing a system to document the
people who have read the transcripts or copies of them, and the people to whom infor-
mation contained in the transcripts has been passed. -
Thornburgh, Reconciling Effective Federal Prosecution and the Fifth Amendment: "Crimi-
nal Coddling," "The New Torture" or "A Rational Accommodation?", 67 J. CraM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 155, 164 (1976).
1981] 1717
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
trial. 27 Thus, in each of the above situations, defense witness im-
munity places only a negilgible burden or no burden whatsoever on
the prosecutor, and a refusal to grant immunity must be consid-
ered unreasonable under the circumstances.
3. The Witness' Interest
The witness' fifth amendment privilege constitutes an excep-
tion to the general principle that "the public has a claim to every
man's evidence. 3 28 Naturally, the witness has an interest in main-
taining the complete protection of his privilege. The Supreme
Court, however, has not interpreted the fifth amendment guaran-
tee-"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself"329 -in a literal sense. Rather, the
Court has indicated that the amendment only guarantees the wit-
ness freedom from self-incrimination if he has not received immu-
nity. The court made clear its interpretation of the amendment
when it held that the 1970 immunity statute provides protection
coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege. 0 In Kastigar,
when the Court diminished the weight accorded the prosecutor's
interest,33 1 it also decreased the scope of the witness' interest. Af-
ter Kastigar the witness' interest is limited to protection from the
direct or indirect use of his compelled testimony against him.
Witnesses sometimes seek to avoid testifying by asserting that
the fifth amendment privilege provides broader protection than
freedom from criminal penalties. The Supreme Court, however,
has specifically rejected claims that the fifth amendment protects
witnesses from public disgrace or embarrassment.33 2 Following this
327. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The continuance should occur before the jury is empanel-
led because a lengthy continuance after the commencement of trial might require the selec-
tion of another jury. The defendant would have to notify the prosecution before trial that he
may need to immunize a witness. This procedure would not violate the defendant's fifth
amendment privilege even though it would require him to reveal elements of his defense
before trial. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 80-86 (1970) (state may require defendant
to give advance notice of alibi defense). Indeed, if the defendant gives the government no-
tice before trial of his need to immunize a witness, the state may have sufficient time to
gather enough evidence with which to prosecute the witness, and thus, a continuance may
be avoided altogether.
328. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
329. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
330. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453-55 (1972); see text accompanying
note 148 supra.
331. See text accompanying notes 317-19 supra.
332. Ulhnann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591
(1896); see Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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reasoning, courts have held that the privilege does not protect the
witness from injunctive relief, a3 loss of employment, 4 treble dam-
ages in a civil suit,335 or public infamy.336 More recently, Congress
specifically included a "criminal case" limitation s37 in the 1970 im-
munity statute. Patrick v. United States"3 8 is perhaps the most
prominent case to enforce this limitation. In this case the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the Internal Revenue Service's jeopardy assess-
ment against Patrick for unpaid gambling taxes of $900,000, even
though the IRS only became aware of the deficit after Patrick gave
immunized testimony in a criminal grand jury proceeding.33 9 De-
spite the grant of immunity, Patrick unquestionably was not left
"in substantially the same position"3 40 as if he had not testified.
Patrick and similar cases have provoked extensive criticism of the
immunity procedure and further arguments that the witness
should have protected interests in addition to freedom from crimi-
nal liability.34 1 While such arguments may be persuasive, they
must give way in the face of the defendant's due process right to a
fair trial. The defendant's need for access to exculpatory evidence
outweighs the witness' interest in not testifying whenever the pos-
sible detriment to the witness does not include criminal liability.
C. The Compulsory Process Analysis
In addition to arguments based on a separation of powers
analysis and the due process clause, the defense attorney can in-
333. Bowles v. Misle, 64 F. Supp. 835 (D. Neb. 1946).
334. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
335. Amato v. Porter, 157 F.2d 719, 722 (10th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 812
(1947).
336. Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 147 (1949).
337. Section 6002 provides that the compelled testimony may not be "used against the
witness in any criminal case." 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976).
338. 524 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1975).
339. The court stated,
Patrick's Fifth Amendment privilege against being compelled to be a witness against
himself in any criminal case does not afford him protection against giving testimony
that will disclose his civil liability unless, of course, that testimony may subject him to
criminal prosecution. The grant of immunity removed his only legitimate objection to
giving the government an honest and complete statement, even if compelled, of the
facts which may give rise to gambling tax liability. Unlike a forfeiture or the imposition
of a fine, the jeopardy assessment is merely a method of enforcing a civil obligation,
rather than a form of punishment.
Id. at 1118-19.
340. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 462.
341. See Wolfson, Immunity, Right or Wrong? Wrong!, 20 TRiAL LAw. Gums 65
(1976).
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voke the sixth amendment's guarantee of compulsory process 42 in
support of a criminal defendant's application for witness immu-
nity. The history of the judicial treatment of the clause weighs in
favor of defense witness immunity. In the early case of In re Dil-
lon3 43 a California district court observed that the compulsory pro-
cess clause was "intended to abrogate the harsh and tyrannical
rules of the common law ... and to place the accused in a position
to make his defense and establish his innocence, by giving him
rights in all respects similar and equal to those possessed by the
government for establishing his guilt.3844 A persuasive argument
can be made that the clause is impaired when the defendant is
denied an investigatory tool that, although unknown at the crea-
tion of the sixth amendment, has since been developed for use by
the prosecution. This equal access analysis is similar to the due
process argument in Wardius v. Oregon that fairness requires the
court to neutralize the imbalance in the investigatory powers of the
defense and prosecution by allowing for reciprocal discovery.3 45 In
fact, one commentator has observed that while the Court in
Wardius emphasized the general due process requirement of fair-
ness, "its reasoning is more consistent with the specific fairness re-
quired by the compulsory process clause. ' '3 4 e
The sixth amendment guarantees the defendant the means to
compel witnesses to appear on his behalf. The right to compel the
attendance of witnesses, however, is meaningless without the com-
panion right to obtain their testimony. Prior to 1967 the Supreme
Court had referred to the compulsory process clause only five
times, twice in dictum,3 47 and three times when the Court found it
unnecessary to construe the clause.3' 8 In Washington v. Texas 49
342. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
343. 7 F. Cas. 710 (N.D. Cal. 1854) (No. 3914).
344. Id. at 712.
345. See text accompanying notes 306-10 supra.
346. Westen, supra note 33, at 181.
347. United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 172 (1891) (dictum that government
need not issue free subpoenas to the defendant); United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
360, 363-65 (1851), overruled in Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918) (dictum that
compulsory process clause codifies common law as it existed in 1791).
348. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 n.1 (1966) (unnecessary to decide whether
trial court erred in failing to grant defendant a continuance to subpoena witnesses for whom
he refused to make an offer of proof); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 442 (1932)
(unnecessary to decide validity of a statute that granted extraterritorial subpoena power
solely to prosecution and denied it to defense); Ex parte Harding, 120 U.S. 782, 784 (1887)
(unnecessary to decide an unspecified compulsory process issue).
349. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
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the Court first affirmed the defendant's right to compulsory pro-
cess. Initially, the Court in Washington broadly construed the
clause as guaranteeing "the right to present a defense," which con-
stitutes "a fundamental element of due process of law" applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment.350 Next, it denied
the claim that courts can freely regulate the testimonial compe-
tence of defense witnesses. In the Court's words, "The Framers of
the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of giving
to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses
whose testimony he had no right to use. ' ss5 Finally, the Court in-
validated a state law that prohibited participants in a crime from
testifying on behalf of a coparticipant. The Court used the follow-
ing standard to find that the law violated the defendant's compul-
sory process rights: A defendant has "the right to put on the stand
a witness who [is] physically and mentally capable of testifying
... and whose testimony [is] relevant and material to the
defense. '3 52
In Washington the Court expressly declined to decide whether
testimonial privileges can deny defendants potentially exculpatory
evidence. 53 The Court has determined that both the witness' right
to freedom from self-incrimination and the defendant's compul-
sory process rights are fundamental constitutional rights,s " but
the Constitution does not indicate which of the two rights has
greater value. The Court, however, has observed that it is "intoler-
able that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in
order to assert another. 3 55 Nevertheless, the sixth amendment
specifically places an affirmative duty on the state to ensure fair-
ness in the trial process. Accordingly, courts after Washington
have held that compulsory process requires more than pro forma
issuance of subpoenas; rather it requires the state to apply its pow-
ers and resources under appropriate circumstances to ensure that
the defendant receives a fair trial.35 6 Thus, when the prosecutor
350. Id. at 19.
351. Id. at 23.
352. Id. (footnote omitted).
353. The Court stated that "[niothing in this opinion should be construed as disap-
proving testimonial privileges, such as the privilege against self-incrimination or the lawyer-
client or husband-wife privileges, which are based on entirely different considerations from
those underlying the common-law disqualifications for interest." Id. at 23 n.21.
354. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-incrimination).
355. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
356. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 375 F. Supp. 872, 875-76 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
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denies the defendant the opportunity to present a witness in his
defense, the sixth amendment should trigger concern for whether
the Government has arbitrarily declined to use its powers to com-
pel testimony in the defendant's behalf. When the Govenment pos-
sesses the statutory power to grant a defendant's application for
witness immunity and when the witness is competent to give testi-
mony that is relevant, material, and favorable to the defendant,
then the Government's failure to grant immunity violates the de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process.
V. CONCLUSION
Literally read, the fifth amendment language guarantees a wit-
ness an absolute right to remain silent once he asserts the privi-
lege, not merely a right to silence unless he receives immunity 3 7
Since the endorsement of the literal approach would necessarily
abolish one of the most effective and highly utilized information
gathering tools35 8 that, through a long and tortuous history, 5 9 has
indeed "become part of our constitutional fabric,"3 60 it is unlikely
that the Supreme Court will consider the adoption of a strict inter-
pretation. The prosecution presently retains the exclusive power to
immunize witnesses in all jurisdictions except the Third Circuit.
The controversy over the propriety of immunity for defense wit-
nesses began only in the relatively recent past and is the subject of
continuing debate. Although one commentator recently concluded
that "wholesale transplantation of prosecution witness use immu-
nity analysis to the defense witness area is a fundamental analytic
error,"8 1 this Note has outlined various constitutional arguments
that the criminal defendant can invoke in support of an applica-
tion for witness immunity.
First, the Note relies on the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Nixon for its argument that courts should use a
flexible separation of powers approach in the context of witness
immunity grants.382 While the Nixon Court accepted the notion
that separation of powers protects the decisionmaking authority of
the individual branches of government from infringement by the
357. See text accompanying notes 329-30 supra.
358. See text accompanying notes 153-56 supra..
359. See text accompanying notes 44-156 supra.
360. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
361. Comment, Defense Witness Immunity and the Right to a Fair Trial, 129 U. PA.
L. REv. 377, 379 (1980).
362. See text accompanying notes 285-91 supra.
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other branches, it observed that the doctrine does not enforce an
absolute executive privilege. Thus, the separation of powers doc-
trine need not preclude judicial review of executive discretion in all
circumstances. The Court also stressed that the defendant's need
to obtain all relevant evidence should outweigh a general claim of
executive privilege in a criminal trial. Thus, Nixon is persuasive
authority for the position that courts should willingly review dis-
cretionary actions of the prosecutor.
Second, this Note consideres the feasibility of initiating a due
process claim when the government denies a request for defense
witness immunity.36 The holdings of Brady and Roviaro exemplify
the great weight traditionally accorded the defendant's need for
evidence. The doctrine of reciprocal discovery lends further
credence to the proposition that the defense should have immunity
grants available to it and that such immunity should not be depen-
dent on the government's decision to immunize one of its own wit-
nesses. The change in the scope of protection from transactional to
use immunity has significantly reduced the weight accorded the
government's interests in denying immunity to a defense witness.
Although the prosecutor may occasionally encounter added incon-
venience when he later attempts to prosecute an immunized de-
fense witness, the added costs may be adequately minimized so
that the burden on the government is substantially reduced. Fi-
nally, the change to use immunity also reduced the weight given to
the witness' interest. The immunized witness' interest is now lim-
ited to protection from use or derivative use of his compelled testi-
mony in a subsequent criminal case. Thus, a balancing of the three
interests at stake when the defense requests witness immunity in-
dicates that the due process analysis often constitutes a convincing
argument in favor of an award of immunity.
Last, the Note argues that defense counsel can advance the
sixth amendment's guarantee of compulsory process as a final basis
for a claim of witness immunity.3 " The Supreme Court's holding
in Washington v. Texas demonstrates that the sixth amendment
guarantees not only the right to compel the attendance of wit-
nesses, but also the right to have them testify. Since the state's
role includes the duty to utilize its resources to ensure a fair trial,
its failure to immunize a defense witness violates the defendant's
compulsory process rights whenever a competent witness could
363. See text accompanying notes 292-341 supra.
364. See text accompanying notes 342-56 supra.
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have provided relevant and material testimony favorable to the
defense.
Once the constitutional basis for defense witness immunity is
recognized, the proper method by which to implement it must be
determined. Although the most appropriate course would be a con-
gressional amendment to the current immunity statute, the legisla-
tive history of immunity statutes demonstrates that Congress has
traditionally acted only in response to the Government's need to
immunize a specific class of witnesses in a particularly disturbing
situation. Congress, then, is unlikely to amend the current law in
the near future. Moreover, even if Congress did take the initiative
and begin work on a statutory amendment providing for defense
witness immunity, long delays could occur before the amendment
would be ready for passage simply because of the cumbersome na-
ture of the legislative process. In the interim, therefore, an alterna-
tive procedure is needed to ensure that the defendant receives a
fair trial and can present the testimony of reluctant witnesses in a
manner similar to that available to the prosecution. In Virgin Is-
lands v. Smiths6 5 the Third Circuit broke with formidable prece-
dent and announced a creative solution to the problem: judicially
granted defense witness immunity. While at least one commenta-
tor has found that the Smith approach has merely confused an al-
ready "agonizingly complicated"36 legal question, this Note con-
cludes that in light of the above constitutional analysis, the Smith
proposal provides the appropriate remedy.
The key to the Smith decision lies in the standard the Third
Circuit set for a grant of judicial immunity: "[Immunity must be
properly sought in the district court; the defense witness must be
available to testify; the proffered testimony must be clearly excul-
patory; the testimony must be essential; and there must be no
strong governmental interests which countervail against a grant of
immunity. 3 6 7 While judicial immunity represents an expansive so-
lution to the problem, the court imposed a strict standard. The
Third Circuit willingly took an affirmative step to protect the con-
stitutional rights of defendants, but it nonetheless recognized that
the intrusion into an area traditionally reserved for the executive
branch requires recognition of any legitimate state interests. Thus,
the court appears to have applied the flexible separation of powers
365. See text accompanying notes 196-223 supra.
366. See Comment, supra note 361, at 416.
367. Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1980).
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approach since it was willing to invade the province of the execu-
tive, yet it was unwilling to step too far across the dividing line
between the two branches of government. Despite one commenta-
tor's criticism of this aspect of the Smith standard, 8' this Note
contends that the standard represents a suitable approach to the
controversial defense witness immunity issue.
United States v. Shobers"6 further refined the Smith analysis.
First, the Shober court concluded that the court need not walt un-
til the close of the prosecutor's case to immunize a defense witness.
Second, the court held that the defendant must offer either direct
testimony or a written statement from the prospective witness in
order to establish that the witness' testimony complies with the
Smith standard. The Shober refinements significantly increase the
manageability of implementing the Smith approach. The first re-
finement aids the defendant because of the flexible time frame in
which he may request witness immunity. It also aids the prosecu-
tion because the earlier the defense makes the request, the greater
the prosecutor's opportunity to minimize his burden if he later de-
cides to prosecute the witness. The second refinement imposes a
high standard, namely that third-party evidence does not suffi-
ciently satisfy the defendant's burden-a standard that should be
favorably received by federal prosecutors.
Restriction of witness immunity to the prosecution is, as Jus-
tice Marshall once observed in a different context, "completely at
odds with the overriding interest in assuring that evidence tending
to show innocence is brought to the jury's attention. '3 7 0 The
court's duty to ensure that a fair trial serves as the basis for the
determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence supports an
award of judicial immunity when the prosecutor fails to grant it.
Moreover, the courts historically have been authorized to create
judicial remedies, such as the exclusionary rule and damages, in
order to vindicate constitutional rights.37 1 If courts can invoke ju-
dicially created remedies to protect the fourth amendment right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 87 then the courts can
appropriately take affirmative action and implement the immunity
368. See Comment, supra note 361, at 407.
369. See text accompanying notes 224-40 supra.
370. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 117 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
371. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)
(warrantless search and arrest without probable cause in violation of fourth amendment
gives rise to federal cause of action for damages).
372. Id.
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procedure to protect the defendant's constitutional right to a fair
trial-a right that Congress has thus far deemed unworthy of pro-
tection. The Smith approach, together with the refinements out-
lined in Shober, provides a manageable solution to the problem of
providing immunity for defense witnesses and appropriately takes
account of countervailing state interests. Thus, this Note concludes
that other courts should adopt the Smith-Shober approach when
faced with a prosecutor's denial of an application for defense wit-
ness immunity.
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